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FREE ADVERTISING: THE CASE FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS AS 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
by                                                                                                                      
Tamara R. Piety* 
The commercial speech doctrine, the doctrine establishing a subcategory 
of protected speech under the First Amendment, has been under 
increased fire, most prominently in 2003 with Nike v. Kasky, but also in 
other cases around the country covering a variety of contexts. A key 
distinguishing attribute of the commercial speech doctrine is that it 
permits the government to regulate the speech that it covers for its truth. 
This is precisely what the government may not regulate in the area of 
political and expressive speech. Many critics would like to see the 
commercial speech doctrine done away with altogether. They argue 
commercial speech should be treated like political and expressive speech 
under the First Amendment. Professor Piety has argued elsewhere that 
subjecting commercial speech to the same strict scrutiny as political and 
expressive speech would have far reaching negative consequences. In 
this Article, Professor Piety addresses a narrower concern: the argument 
that (assuming efforts to eliminate it altogether fail) the commercial 
speech doctrine’s application should be expressly limited to “traditional 
advertising,” excluding corporate speech in the form of public relations. 
She proposes that this argument is misplaced because the purposes 
articulated by the Supreme Court in establishing the commercial speech 
doctrine would be better served by applying it to all marketing-related 
speech, including public relations. 
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Advertising is publicity that a firm pays for; public relations seek 
publicity that does not require payment to the media for time or space.1 
Advertising is the continuation of public relations by other means and 
should be started only after a PR program has run its course.2 
 
The commercial speech doctrine, the doctrine establishing a subcategory 
of protected speech under the First Amendment, has been under increased fire, 
most prominently in 2003 with Nike v. Kasky,3 but also in other cases around 
the country covering a variety of contexts.4 A key distinguishing attribute of the 
commercial speech doctrine is that it permits the government to regulate the 
speech that it covers for its truth. This is precisely what the government may 
not regulate in the area of political and expressive speech.5 Many critics would 
like to see the commercial speech doctrine done away with altogether.6 They 
argue commercial speech should be treated like political and expressive speech 
 
1 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT 
ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 100 (1984). 
2 AL RIES & LAURA RIES, THE FALL OF ADVERTISING AND THE RISE OF PR xii (2002). 
3 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
4 United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (First Amendment offered as 
a defense to securities fraud); Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(marketers of saw palmetto who claimed on label that it might be beneficial for prostate 
condition asserted First Amendment as a defense to FDA action). 
5 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271−72 (1964) (First 
Amendment may require government to tolerate even false or erroneous speech in some 
contexts). 
6 See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief for the Advancement of 
Capitalism Supporting Petitioners at 3−11, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) 
(arguing for reconsideration and abolishment of commercial speech doctrine). The Center for 
the Advancement of Capitalism actually argued for the reinstatement of the Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) standard which would arguably permit even more 
regulation of commercial speech than the current doctrine. See infra notes 31–76 and 
accompanying text. 
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under the First Amendment.7 I have argued elsewhere that subjecting 
commercial speech to the same strict scrutiny as political and expressive speech 
would have far reaching negative consequences.8 Here I address a narrower 
concern: the argument that (assuming efforts to eliminate it altogether fail) the 
commercial speech doctrine’s application should be expressly limited to 
“traditional advertising,” excluding corporate speech in the form of public 
relations.9 I propose that this argument is misplaced because the purposes 
articulated by the Supreme Court in establishing the commercial speech 
doctrine would be better served by applying it to all marketing-related speech, 
including public relations.10 
The claim that the commercial speech doctrine ought to be confined to 
traditional advertising was raised by Nike11 and by many of its amici12 in the 
Nike v. Kasky case.13 The argument is that the form of communication should 
dictate its treatment under the doctrine.14 Thus, because the disputed 
communications in the Nike case were delivered in the form of press releases, 
letters to the editor, advertorials, issue ads, and the like, Nike and its amici 
argued that the statements contained therein should be treated as political, and 
 
7 See, e.g., Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere 
Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383 (2005); Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It 
Up A Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1205 (2004); Comment, Free Speech Protections for Corporations: Competing in the 
Markets of Commerce and Ideas, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2004). 
8 Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right 
to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151, 188−99 (2005) [hereinafter Piety, Grounding Nike]. Nor do I 
attempt to address here the more complicated issue of corporate speech−that is, speech by a 
corporation in non-marketing contexts. That too I have addressed elsewhere. Tamara R. 
Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression: Some Reflections on Existing and 
Potential Costs (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Piety, 
Against Freedom of Commercial Expression]. See also R. George Wright, Freedom and 
Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 DEN. U. L. REV. 137 (1994). 
9 See, e.g., Bruce E.H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is The 
Key to Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243 (2004). 
10 At present it is not clear what the doctrine covers. That the public relations and 
marketing industry experts still believe it could go either way—that is, full protection or 
fully commercial—is illustrated by the following article appearing recently in the Journal of 
Advertising. Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Legal Challenge of Integrated Marketing 
Communication (IMC): Integrating Commercial and Political Speech, 34 J. ADVERTISING, 
93 (2005). 
11 See Brief for Petitioners at 22−24, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575) (arguing 
that California decision “expands” the definition of commercial speech). 
12 See, e.g., Brief for the Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
13, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575) (state interest in regulating speech is “strong and 
legitimate” with respect to traditional advertising); Brief for Exxonmobil et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575) (“Only when a 
corporation’s statements are presented as a part of a corporation’s selling message in a 
product advertisement or a product label can the government’s interest in preventing 
‘commercial harms’ arguably justify a degree of regulation not permitted for speech by other 
speakers.”). 
13 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
14 See also Johnson & Fisher, supra note 9. 
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thus fully protected, speech. Central to this argument was a characterization of 
Nike as a “speaker” with speech “rights.” This was a powerful rhetorical 
device; one that many observers found persuasive.15 However, the power of 
this metaphor of the corporation as a “person” with “speech rights” tends to 
obscure the degree to which statements made to the press through the vehicle of 
public relations are an integral part of most corporations’ marketing plans.16 
They aren’t “opinions” or expression as we normally think of them–at least not 
for the corporation. They are marketing. Moreover, even the most cursory study 
of current marketing practices reveals that issues such as labor and 
environmental practices are considered integral parts of the corporate image 
and thus relevant to marketing the firm by those who market it. Speech on these 
topics is always of commercial interest to the firm making it. That is its 
primary, perhaps only, legitimate interest given the duty to shareholders. 17 
As noted, many have argued that the commercial speech doctrine, which 
permits more governmental regulation of speech deemed “commercial” than of 
speech deemed “political,” ought only to apply to speech issued in a 
“traditional product advertising” format.18 Apart from the difficulties of clearly 
defining “traditional product advertising” format, this argument isn’t supported 
by a close review of the Supreme Court’s cases. Although in some cases the 
Court implies that commercial speech is advertising, thus lending some support 
for the position (if only tangentially) in fact the Court has not clearly defined 
what constitutes “commercial speech,” let alone what “traditional advertising 
format” might be. And in other cases, the Court has rejected the proposition 
that all advertising, traditional or otherwise, equals “commercial speech” or that 
the mere linkage of advertising to an issue of public concern will convert 
commercial speech to fully protected political speech.19 
 
15 Moreover, it finds support in some of the Court’s decisions which treat corporations 
as speakers with rights. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). But see 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (retreating from the strong 
stance of corporate speaker as indistinguishable from individual speaker). 
16 On the power of metaphor see Steven L. Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 753−57 (1992); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, 
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989); 
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
17 Indeed, some in the pro-Nike camp admitted as much. “[B]ecause corporations are 
entities whose decision makers owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and owners, no 
responsible corporate spokesman speaks on a company’s behalf without being concerned 
about the effects the statements may have on corporate sales and profits.” Brief for Arthur 
W. Page Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18−19, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 
654 (No. 02-575) (emphasis added). I argue, in Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 
that is the only legitimate interest for commercial expression under current principles of 
corporate governance. See supra note 8. See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: 
Why Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998). 
18 See, e.g., Brief for Forty Leading Newspapers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 3, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575). 
19 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66−69 (1983). 
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Given that much traditional advertising makes few, if any, explicit claims, 
limiting the commercial speech doctrine to traditional product advertising 
would potentially leave the government presiding over an increasingly empty 
set—that is, free to regulate “advertising,” but only as to explicit claims in a 
context where few explicit claims are made and powerless to regulate non-
product advertising marketing speech, a context where many explicit claims 
may be made. Many of the claims the government has an interest in 
regulating—false health, safety, and environmental claims by for-profit 
corporations—are made in the context of marketing efforts outside of 
traditional advertising, such as in press releases which attempt to position these 
marketing claims as “news.” Moreover, “the market” that advertisers are 
concerned with is made up of not just “consumers,” but also investors, 
reporters, banks, employees, stockholders, and many others.20 
I argue here that the Court should clearly state that the term “commercial 
speech” broadly encompasses all speech that could be characterized as 
marketing or related to for-profit corporate self-promotion. In other words I 
propose the following formula: public relations = marketing = commercial 
speech, absent some factual circumstances that might suggest a different 
treatment. This proposal is premised on Professor Steven Shiffrin’s argument21 
that there is no single value or theory animating the First Amendment and that 
the most promising approach to the issues that implicate it is a nuanced, multi-
factor approach. I hope in this Article to offer some of the concrete examples of 
why, consistent with the theory for protection of commercial speech, 
“commercial speech” should be interpreted broadly to include many statements 
made in the context of public relations because such statements’ primary, if not 
exclusive aim, is a marketing aim.  Such statements are aimed at making a 
contribution to public discussion. 
Part I reviews the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.22 case, which established the commercial speech 
doctrine and reviews the justifications offered therein for its creation. These 
justifications suggest that the interests the Court meant to protect in the early 
articulation of the doctrine are equally implicated by marketing in the form of 
public relations.23 The foundational and controlling case law demonstrates that 
 
20 Of course many of these groups include consumers since the categories are not 
hermetically sealed. 
21 Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a 
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983). See also J.M. 
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990). 
22 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
23 What is not discussed in this Article is whether the strong version of commercial 
speech, the version that equates corporate speech with commercial speech, and which 
employs the metaphor of corporation as “speaker” with speech “rights” can be squared with 
theories of what the First Amendment is meant to protect. I am not certain that it can. I 
address this question in a separate article and suggest that the commercial speech doctrine 
perhaps represents a wrong turn in the interpretation of the First Amendment. See Piety, 
Grounding Nike, supra note 8. This Article does not challenge the commercial speech 
doctrine per se and presumes the legitimacy of the interests expressed by the Court in 
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the Court constructed the commercial speech doctrine primarily for the 
protection of the consumer and to promote the efficient operation of the market 
by providing for protection of truthful commercial speech and limiting the 
government’s ability to paternalistically suppress or regulate such truthful 
speech on the alleged grounds of consumer welfare. The Court reasoned that 
advertising contained information that, if truthful, the government should 
ordinarily not suppress, absent fairly compelling circumstances.24 Consumers 
should be trusted with the truth and the market’s efficient operation depends on 
information. But for precisely the same reasons, the Court retained the 
government’s power to regulate such speech for its truth and to suppress, or 
(more accurately) to provide sanctions for untruthful or misleading speech. The 
subsequent sections illustrate that these interests are also implicated by speech 
that takes the form of public relations and thus that such speech ought to be 
considered at least presumptively “commercial” unless proven otherwise. 
Part II of the Article addresses the question of advertising’s alleged 
informational function. The Supreme Court has at times appeared to use the 
terms “advertising” and “commercial speech” as if they were synonymous and 
yet in other contexts clearly indicated that they are not synonymous. This 
section argues that the two terms are not synonyms. Advertising is a subset of 
marketing. And while advertising has some informational function, its principal 
function is to sell and it need not provide much information to do so. In this it 
overlaps with other kinds of marketing speech that also contain some 
information. Indeed, pursuant to industry practice, there is often more 
information outside of advertising than in it. The Court’s assumption that 
advertising’s function is primarily informational bears little resemblance to the 
observable practice. Nor does it track the understanding drawn from marketing 
professionals and academics as to how they understand advertising and how it 
fits generally into a marketing plan. In their view advertising is only one part of 
an overall marketing program in which important information may be conveyed 
through marketing devices other than the traditional product advertising or the 
use of traditional advertising format. A key part of this plan is the development 
of brand identity. And brand identity is maintained through several devices—
advertising is only one of those devices.. 
 
establishing the doctrine so as to provide a starting point for analyzing whether those 
interests are also served by treating public relations speech as commercial speech. Again, I 
am not suggesting that there is a single value that the First Amendment can be said to 
protect. See Shriffin, supra note 21, and Balkin, supra note 20. See also Steven L. Winter, 
Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 965 
(1993). 
24 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770−73. (observing that while the 
government may not protect the public from truthful information about legal activity, the 
government may retain the right to regulate the form, time, place and manner, ads about 
illegal activity, and provide special rules for the media). See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (articulating the still 
applicable 4-part test: speech must (1) concern a lawful activity, (2) not be misleading, (3) 
the regulation must directly advance the government’s interest, and (4) do so no more than 
necessary to accomplish objectives). 
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Part III discusses the issue of brand identity as an amalgam of several 
factors which involve not only issues regarding the qualities of the products or 
services, but also about the processes that generate those products and services. 
Increasingly it is the case that consumers are interested in channeling their 
consumption25 to certain types of companies or companies that engage in, or 
refrain from, certain practices. For example, in the 2005 Christmas season, 
some religious groups urged doing business only with companies that explicitly 
referred to “Christmas” rather than to “holiday” in their advertising and 
promotional displays.26 Some consumers are interested in whether a 
manufacturer is “sweatshop free” or whether it conducts manufacturing in 
environmentally sound ways or produces a product that is not harmful to the 
environment.27 For decades many consumers have been interested in “buying 
American” and seek assurances that a product is “Made in the U.S.A.” Drawing 
on the work of Professor Douglas Kysar and using his terminology, I argue that 
these “preferences for process” are as legitimate an expression of consumer 
interest as color, quality, price, and other conventional loci of consumer 
interests.28 
However, without accurate and reliable information on issues such as 
environmental, labor, animal testing, and other practices, consumers are unable 
to use their purchasing “vote” to reflect their interests and preferences in these 
areas. And in the absence of negative consequences for false statements, some 
sellers can free-ride on the efforts of others—that is, benefit from identifying 
their products as “cruelty-free” without actually incurring the costs of making 
the production changes that would warrant such a designation. It is significant 
to the issue of negative consequences that often much of the information about 
environmental, labor, animal testing, and other such practices is conveyed 
through public relations mechanisms such as press releases, advertorials, 
interviews, editorial comments, web page commentary and the like. Delivered 
in this form, the speech appears to some observers as protected speech. But to 
its practitioners it is (when it works) just free advertising. 
Part IV explores the practice of public relations—the source of that “free 
advertising.” Here I examine the foundations of the profession. The key point 
that emerges in this section is that public relations speech is a form of 
marketing which gains credibility and effectiveness because of its delivery 
through a third party—the media. Although it need not be so, it has often been 
the case that the various media outlets have been fairly uncritical of “news” 
coming from interested sources and shown a perhaps distressing willingness to 
“report” information obtained through a company’s press officer without 
 
25 Actually it is not just consumption activities, but also investing. See Cynthia L. 
Cooper, Religious Right Discovers Investment Activism, CORPWATCH, Aug. 3, 2005, 
http://www.corpwatch.org/print_article.php?id=12527. 
26 Adam Cohen, Op-Ed., This Season’s War Cry: Commercialize Christmas, or Else, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 4, at 11. 
27 Samar Farah, The Thin Green Line, CMO MAG., Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/120105/green_line.html?action=print. 
28 See also Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United 
States Congress at 10−14, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).  
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attribution or independent verification of the facts.29 When a newspaper carries 
a company’s “message” it is better than any advertising because it is both free 
and more credible to the public than it would be coming directly from the 
company. And, for the reasons explored in the previous sections, many of those 
“messages” involve the company’s labor, environmental, and other process 
practices that relate to its image, reputation, and personality—all of which are 
directly relevant to sales. Such claims are more likely to be covered as “news” 
than simple product descriptions, but they nevertheless contribute to the bottom 
line. Moreover, many of the explicit claims that the government may have an 
interest in regulating as a matter of consumer and environmental protection are 
made in the context of public relations initiatives. 
In Part IV, I offer two case studies indicating why the statements made in 
the public relations context are as relevant, if not more so, to the quality of 
information in the market and to consumer protection, the reasons commercial 
speech was protected in the first place, as any statements made in the traditional 
product advertising context. To illustrate this claim I take two specific 
examples: the role played by publicity in Enron and the role played by public 
relations with respect to information on the impact of cigarette smoking on 
public health as documented in the recent tobacco litigation brought by the 
United States. These examples are only a few of many that illustrate that public 
health and welfare may depend upon the government’s ability to regulate the 
quality of information in the market and to provide appropriate sanctions for 
false and misleading information.30 
 
29 JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU: LIES, 
DAMN LIES AND THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY 179−96 (1995) (chapter entitled All The 
News That is Fit to Print, describing interpenetration of news and public relations 
professions, heavy reliance of journalists on public relations news releases, manipulation of 
journalists, etc.). See also Diane Farsetta & Daniel Price, Center for Media and Democracy, 
Fake TV News: Widespread and Undisclosed, Apr. 6, 2006 available at 
http://www.prwatch.org/node/4550/ (report of 10 month nationwide study of the undisclosed 
use of video news releases (VNR)). This practice also undermines the argument made by the 
media amici in Nike that there is no need to provide liability for false statements made in this 
context because the public can rely on the media to ferret out the deception. See Brief for 
Forty Leading Newspapers et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 18, at 22−26 (media coverage 
of Nike demonstrates that regulation is unnecessary).  For a discussion of a distinct, but 
related, source of distortion in the press—the threat of withdrawal of advertising on the basis 
of content—see Byron Calame, Op-Ed., Cracks in the Wall Between Advertising and News, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, § 4, at 12. This problem is also discussed in, among others, 
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 56−57 (1999) (“[I]n 1997 the 
Wall St. Journal reported that some major national advertisers demanded to know the 
contents of specific issues of magazines before they would agree to place ads in them.”). C. 
EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44−70 (1994) (chapter 11, 
Advertising and the Content of a Democratic Press, describing commercial pressure to shape 
content). This second source of concern is not the subject of this Article. But its existence 
further undermines the suggestion that concerns for “balance” and airing all views require 
offering First Amendment protection to commercial entities’ marketing efforts that appear as 
editorial content. 
30 All sides in this debate may be guilty of not making explicit the perhaps significant 
difference between regulation in the form of suppression and regulation in the form of 
permissible sanctions for violations of the prohibition on false statements of fact. Although 
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Finally, in Part V, I propose a test for distinguishing between protected 
speech and commercial speech in the context of public relations statements. 
The test is meant to be a starting point for a more Realist approach to the 
assessment of commercial speech under the First Amendment and builds on the 
existing test articulated by the California Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 
This is only meant as a starting point for analysis and undoubtedly does not 
mean there will be no difficult cases. But the alternative that the proponents of 
expanded commercial speech propose, full First Amendment protection for 
everything but traditional product advertising, would mean losing significant 
control over speech with important economic, public health, and welfare 
implications. 
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The commercial speech doctrine is a controversial subsection of that 
speech considered protected by the First Amendment.31 The commercial speech 
doctrine protects truthful, not misleading, commercial speech, while making 
explicit the government’s power to regulate commercial speech within the 
guidelines set out in the doctrine. The doctrine entails virtually unlimited ability 
to regulate untruthful or misleading speech, while providing limitations on the 
government’s ability to regulate truthful commercial speech. Prior to the 
creation of the commercial speech doctrine, most observers and the Court 
appeared to believe that the government had unlimited ability to regulate any 
commercial speech. So the limitations on the ability to regulate commercial 
speech, of heightened scrutiny of fit and purpose, as set forth in the still 
controlling case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,32 represented an expansion of the scope of the First 
Amendment to areas not previously covered by it. The question is: What were 
the grounds for that expansion? 
 
there is much academic disagreement about the validity of the distinction, see JOHN H. 
GARVEY & FREDRICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 309−10 (2d ed. 1996) 
(collecting articles), doctrinally the Court continues to assert that there are important 
distinctions between the two. “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most 
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Tory v. Cochran, 
125 S.Ct. 2108, 2111 (2005) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 
(1976)). Also, with respect to the varieties of ways to police false advertising, there is some 
evidence that private enforcement actions authorized by law may be more effective than 
regulatory agencies. Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of 
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 71 
(1985). 
31 It is axiomatic that much speech is not covered by the First Amendment at all, even 
though proponents of First Amendment “absolutism” tend to overlook this point. See 
Frederick Schauer, Categories and The First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. 
REV. 265, 273 (1981). 
32 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
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A. The Listeners’ Rights 
The commercial speech doctrine was developed in the context of a claim 
by a consumer group that the government ought not to have the power to 
suppress truthful information about products.33 The truthful information in 
question was price and the product was prescription drugs. The State of 
Virginia argued that the publication of drug prices would result in price wars 
that would ultimately lead to an undesirable decline in professionalism by 
pharmacists. The Virginia Citizens Council argued that the State’s justification 
for suppression of price information was unduly paternalistic. In a free society, 
it argued, consumers ought to be able to make up their own minds about their 
purchases with full information about the product, including the price. The 
Supreme Court agreed. The Court wrote, “the State’s protectiveness of its 
citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in 
ignorance.”34 “It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, 
that the First Amendment makes for us.”35 The State, it noted, may not advance 
its goals of protecting the citizenry “by keeping the public in ignorance of the 
entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.”36 
The interest in accurate information, the Court observed, could have very 
concrete consequences for individuals. Indeed, this was particularly true in the 
context of prescription medications since the availability of a given drug at a 
particular price could make the difference between whether the consumer could 
purchase it and thus make a difference to human health and well being. The 
Court observed that, “[a]s to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow 
of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, 
than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”37 This analysis 
focused on the listeners’ right to receive information, rather than on the 
speaker’s interest in transmitting it, or on any notion of expressive rights in the 
speaker. 
As the Court noted, the case did not involve any claim for the pharmacists 
who would be “directly subject to” the statutory prohibition (such a claim had 
been earlier struck down by a Virginia appellate court), but rather it involved 
consumers interested in receiving the price information.38 The threshold 
question, according to the Court, was whether, even assuming that 
constitutional protection could be extended to the publication of drug prices, 
 
33 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976) (characterizing Virginia’s argument in favor of the price ban as “highly 
paternalistic”). See also Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: 
An Originalist’s Recollection, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004) (article by one of the 
attorneys who argued the Virginia Pharmacy case describing the context in which the 
prevailing argument was developed). 
34 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769. 
35 Id. at 770. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 763 (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at 753. 
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the recipients of that information had standing to advance the claim. The Court 
concluded that its case law on the subject provided that “freedom of speech 
‘necessarily protects the right to receive’” as well as to disseminate 
information.39 “If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to 
receive the advertising . . . .”40 But this formulation required the Court to first 
find a right to advertise, something which it had, up to that point, declined to 
do. 
For example, in 1942, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,41 the Court rejected the 
proposition that the First Amendment protected “purely commercial 
advertising.”42 But by 1973, the Court, while not directly addressing the issue 
of protection for advertising per se, had upheld an ordinance that prohibited 
newspapers from printing want ads for employment segregated by gender on 
the grounds that because the segregation of want ads into gendered categories 
was illegal, the government was constitutionally free to prohibit such speech.43 
Then, two years later, in Bigelow v. Virginia,44 the Court concluded that 
the First Amendment protected the publication in Virginia of advertising of the 
availability of abortion services in New York, even though those services were 
illegal in Virginia and a Virginia statute “made the circulation of any 
publication to encourage or promote the processing of an abortion in Virginia a 
misdemeanor.”45 In Bigelow, the Court announced that the holding in Valentine 
v. Chrestensen was “distinctly a limited one.”46 However, because the Court 
found the abortion ads did more than “simply propose a commercial 
transaction,” it held the ads were protected. 47 As a result, the Virginia 
Pharmacy Court later concluded that the question of whether strictly 
commercial speech might be entitled to any First Amendment protection had 
not been raised in Bigelow.48 Finding the question “squarely before us” for the 
first time since Valentine, the Virginia Pharmacy Court concluded that there 
was some limited First Amendment protection for speech that “does ‘no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.’”49 It observed that the fact that money 
was paid for its dissemination and that the “advertiser’s interest [was] a purely 
economic one” “hardly disqualif[ied] him from protection under the First 
Amendment.”50 
 
39 Id. at 757 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762−63 (1972)) (emphasis 
added). 
40 Id. at 757. 
41 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
42 Id. at 54. 
43 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 
(1973). 
44 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
45 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759−60. 
46 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819. 
47 Id. at 822. 
48 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760−61. 
49 Id. at 761−62 quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relation Comm’n., 413 U.S. 
376, 385 (1973).  
50 Id. at 762. 
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In fact, the Court noted, parties to a labor dispute had primarily economic 
interests with which they were concerned. Yet the protection of the First 
Amendment to labor disputants did not require them to address “unionism in 
general.”51 Rather, the Court found, their individual economic interests in the 
dispute at hand were of significance because “‘the practices in a single factory 
may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread 
systems of marketing.’”52 “Since the fate of such a ‘single factory’ could as 
well turn on its ability to advertise its product as on the resolution of its labor 
difficulties, we see no satisfactory distinction between the two kinds of 
speech.”53 The Court took this observation and segued into a discussion in 
which the principal justifications offered to protect some commercial speech 
had almost everything to do with the listeners, in particular the public at large, 
and little to do with the speakers. 
B. The Need for Accurate Information in the Operation of a Free Market 
Thus, to the “keen interest” of the specific consumers before the Court 
were added the interests of the public at large. “[S]ociety also may have a 
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.”54 
So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the 
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through 
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that 
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To 
this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if 
it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise 
system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as 
to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the 
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten 
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free 
flow of information does not serve that goal. 55 
This observation focuses on the public interest in the efficient functioning of 
the economy, not on anyone’s “rights” to speak. According to the Court, it is in 
the public interest for there to be a free flow of accurate information because 
such a free flow of accurate information is necessary in order for the economy 
to function properly. In the traditional rights analysis to which First 
Amendment rights are often subject, rights are not described as protected for 
solely instrumental reasons, that is, because they further some other goal, even 
though protection may in fact further those other goals. Rather, they are 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 763 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940)) (emphasis added). 
53 Id. (emphasis added). Note that the Court did not say that the only basis for 
extending protection to speech in labor disputes was the significance of that dispute to the 
larger world; but it did imply that it was the justification with the most relevance to the 
current dispute before the Court. 
54 Id. at 764. 
55 Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
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protected as intrinsically valuable components of human dignity or autonomy.56 
However, the Virginia Pharmacy justification for protection of commercial 
speech is almost exclusively instrumental. It protects the dissemination of 
information, not for its own sake, but because of the good that is said to flow 
from it. 
The key premise on which this judgment rests is that that in order for the 
public to be assisted by the information, it must be accurate. Thus, the state 
remained free to regulate speech that was false or misleading. “The First 
Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring 
that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”57 It is 
rather hard to imagine that the Court would find the proposition that the 
dissemination of false information was “indispensable” to the functioning of 
the economy, even if there are some empirical reasons to suppose this might be 
true.58 So then the articulation of the commercial speech doctrine begins with 
the proposition that its protections extend only to truthful speech. “Untruthful 
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”59 
Moreover, the Court found that it was consistent with this principle to regulate 
even speech that wasn’t, strictly speaking, “untruthful” if it merely had the 
potential to be “deceptive or misleading.”60 
This statement of purpose was reiterated in Central Hudson,61 the case that 
remains the controlling test for regulation challenged under the commercial 
speech doctrine.62 In Central Hudson the Court reiterated that, “[t]he First 
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection 
to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the 
 
56 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 880 (1963) (“The theory asserts that freedom of expression, while not the 
sole or sufficient end of society, is a good in itself, or at least an essential element in a good 
society.”); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 
1413−14 (1986) (describing classic liberalism’s identification of autonomy in what he calls 
the Free Speech Tradition, with freedom from interference by the government). The question 
of whose autonomy is protected by dominant interpretations of the First Amendment is 
forcefully raised by Professor Catharine MacKinnon. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 206−13 (1987). 
57 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771−72 (emphasis added). 
58 False statements may in fact generate sales. They may even generate more sales than 
truthful statements as long as people want desperately enough to believe the claims to be 
true. To the extent the economy is fairly dependent upon a high level of consumption and 
any decline in consumption is met with alarm, it may be the case that if a fair amount of that 
consumption is generated by false claims, then even false claims could be said to be 
“indispensable.” There may be evidence for that proposition. But exploring it is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
59 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added). 
60 Id. 
61 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
62 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (observing that Central 
Hudson was the controlling test in the commercial speech area). 
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public about lawful activity.”63 Thus, the test as set forth in the Central Hudson 
case begins with the requirement that the speech in question “concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading.”64 
But if much of the information on which consumers (and other persons 
who may affect the economy such as analysts, investors, business persons, and 
the like) depend is disseminated as public relations speech, then presumably 
there is an equally strong justification for regulating this speech on the very 
same grounds—the proper functioning of the market—that justified the 
protection for price advertising in Virginia Pharmacy. Indeed, this intuition is 
supported by the key role that information plays in securities regulation and 
corporate governance generally. From decisions about whether a board of 
directors’ actions can receive the protection of the business judgment rule,65 to 
the adequacy of proxy solicitations in shareholder votes,66 to the ratification of 
potential conflicts of interest67—in virtually every area of corporate law, 
adequate disclosure is key to protection from liability.68 Presumably this is 
because disclosure is seen as essential to proper market function. It is not 
“disclosure” if it isn’t true. 
It remains then to be explored the source of this alleged distinction 
between “traditional advertising” and public relations when dealing with 
commercial speech. It is a key premise of this Article that the distinction cannot 
be maintained because all of the speech of a for-profit corporation is, 
ultimately, marketing speech. I suggest it was a wrong turn taken in cases such 
as First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti69 and Consolidated Edison Co. of 
New York v. Public Service Commission of New York,70 cases in which the 
 
63 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 566. The remaining prongs of the 4-part test are that: (2) the government’s 
asserted interest in regulating the speech be “substantial;” (3) that the regulation in question 
“directly advances” said interest; and that (4) it does so without being “more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.” 
65 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(B) (focusing on a director’s obligation to be 
well or adequately informed in order to have the benefit of the business judgment rule). 
66 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (“The purpose of § 14(a) 
[of the Securities Exchange Act] is to prevent management or others from obtaining 
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy 
solicitation.”). 
67 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)–(2) (1974). 
68 The focus on the truthfulness in this context raises specters for some of governmental 
“arbitrators of truthfulness.” Brief for the ACLU & the ACLU of Northern California as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
However, this concern obscures the fact that much of the judicial enterprise is directed at 
determining the “truth”–factual and legal–in innumerable situations, an enterprise fraught 
with difficulties given the fallibility of human reasoning processes and the limitations of the 
ability to know the truth of a past event. See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, 
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 96−104 (1998) (describing the Rationalist Tradition under which the 
judicial system proceeds as if such truths are ascertainable). Unless one is prepared to 
abandon the judicial system wholesale, it must be admitted that the law acts as an arbiter of 
truth in many areas, certainly with respect to concrete factual claims.. 
69 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
70 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
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Court found a right for corporations to speak about matters of public concern, 
that raised the prospect, attractive to for-profit corporations, that all speech by 
the corporation could or should arguably be deemed protected because the right 
as analyzed in these cases appeared to reside in the corporation, not in the 
public. 
Because corporations have no “opinion” about matters of public concern, 
apart from their impact on the economic affairs of the corporation—it was 
inevitable that these two categories would collide. As previously noted, the 
broader argument that for-profit corporations ought to have no “rights” at all to 
speech is dealt with in another paper.71 Here I will assume that a distinction can 
be made between a general statement on a matter of public concern, such as the 
statement about the state income tax referendum in Bellotti, where there is no 
obvious connection between the statement and the corporation’s welfare, and 
statements, like those in the Nike case that have a clear connection to the 
corporation’s economic interest or operations, such as a factual statement 
concerning whether it pays minimum wage, even though in both cases the only 
real justification for the expenditure pursuant to principles of corporate 
governance can be that it advanced the company’s economic interests in some 
manner. It is the latter type of communication, speech that directly implicates 
the company specifically—its products, its practices, its policies—that arguably 
constitutes “commercial speech”—even if it is issued in a public relations 
format. 
C. Definitional Difficulties 
The term “commercial speech” has never been very satisfactorily defined 
so that it can be established that the Central Hudson test, as opposed to some 
other test, or no test at all, is applicable to a particular instance of speech. One 
of the problems, and the principal source of controversy, is the difficulty of 
defining “commercial speech.” What is commercial speech? Throughout its 
relatively short lifetime “commercial speech” has been dogged by much the 
same definitional ambiguity as has marked the question of pornography. The 
Court, both in its early rejection of First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech72 and in its later announcement of limited protection in the Virginia 
Pharmacy73 case, seemed untroubled by any definitional ambiguity. And 
although the doctrine has survived many assaults on it, both in case law and in 
academic and other writing, it has been controversial and the controversy has 
escalated over time. 
As Professor David Vladeck has observed, “[f]ew of the early commercial 
speech cases were unanimous.”74 The attempts to formulate a standard that 
 
71 See Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, supra note 8. 
72 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
73 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976). 
74 David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1052−53 (2004). 
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would reflect broad consensus have been unsuccessful even though, as yet, the 
Central Hudson case still stands. But the analysis has moved from a standard 
that was rather deferential to governmental claims for a power to regulate, to 
one that is closer to strict scrutiny.75 “The Central Hudson test the Court now 
employs is a demanding one—a standard so rigorous that it results in virtually 
automatic invalidation of laws restraining truthful commercial speech.”76 Still, 
many commercial interests are not satisfied by this more rigorous doctrine and 
would like to sweep it away altogether or, failing that, to restrict the doctrine 
even more narrowly to “traditional advertising.” An analysis of modern 
marketing vividly illustrates what interests are at stake in this request. But it 
also illustrates what might be a basis for claiming a legitimate governmental 
interest in regulating public relations speech as well as traditional advertising, 
that is, a return to the foundational concern—the role of accurate information in 
the proper functioning of the economy. I begin with an analysis of “traditional 
advertising.” 
II. WHAT IS “ADVERTISING”? 
Ad·ver·tis·ing (ăd′vər-tī′zĭng) n. 1. The act of calling public attention to a 
product or business.77 
According to a leading educational text, advertising is: “A form of either 
mass communication or direct-to-consumer communication that is non-
personal and is paid for by various business firms, nonprofit organizations, and 
individuals who are in some way identified in the advertising message and who 
hope to inform or persuade members of a particular audience.”78 In a chapter 
entitled “Traditional Advertising Media,” the book identifies the vehicles for 
traditional advertising as out-of-home (billboards, etc.) advertising, newspaper, 
magazine, radio, and television advertising.79 
But promotion or marketing of a firm’s products or services is not 
confined to these traditional vehicles. Hence the term, “integrated marketing 
communications” or IMC.80 Marketing communications take place in the form 
of in-store displays, direct mail campaigns, product placement in movies and 
television, promotional tie-ins with movies and television, event sponsorship, 
issue sponsorship, email, give-aways, contests, word-of-mouth campaigns—in 
short, the only limitation for form appears to be the imagination of the 
 
75 Id. at 1055−59. 
76 Id. at 1059. 
77 WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 81 (1984) (all fonts and 
typeface, excepting italics, in original). 
78 TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, & SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF 
INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 621 (6th ed. 2003). 
79 Id. at 354−81. Presumably, although the vehicle is non-traditional, Internet 
advertising would also be “traditional” in the sense of its content. 
80 Id. See also Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Legal Challenge of Integrated Marketing 
Communications (IMC): Integrating Commercial and Political Speech, 34 J. ADVERTISING 
93 (2005). 
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marketer. In the quoted textbook, the author notes, “we use marketing 
communications to refer to the collection of advertising, sales promotions, 
public relations, event marketing, and other communication devices . . ..”81 
Some of these forms may explicitly “propose a commercial transaction,”82 
others may only imply it or be intended to create positive associations with the 
brand.83 It is unclear how the proponents of a limitation to traditional product 
advertising would deal with this proliferation. The Court has also not been 
clear. 
The United States Supreme Court has never really precisely defined 
“advertising.” But it has often used the term as if it were coextensive with 
“commercial speech,” that is, as if all “advertising” = “commercial speech.”84 
Obviously this is not the case since some advertisements—such as the one 
involved in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan85—are treated as political speech. 
The speech in Sullivan was an “ad” in that it was space purchased from the 
newspaper by an outside party. But it did not involve the promotion of, or 
information about, any product. Rather it was a plea for donations for the 
assistance of Martin Luther King and other civil rights demonstrators in the 
South.86 This “ad” was thus appropriately treated not as product advertising but 
as political speech.87 
It is also not the case, much as some observers would like to argue that it 
should be, that as a doctrinal matter, all “commercial speech” = “advertising,” 
at least as that term is traditionally understood. As the Court has previously 
noted, even materials which do include some discussion of matters of public 
concern, and thus are not limited to traditional product advertising, can be 
deemed “commercial speech.”88 “We have made clear that advertising which 
‘links a product to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to 
constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.”89 However, the 
Court has fairly consistently assumed that advertising equaled information and 
that information had some impact on consumer behavior. Both of these 
assumptions are actually fairly problematic and will be explored in more detail 
 
81 SHIMP, supra note 78, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
82 This definition was proposed in the Virginia Pharmacy case. Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). 
83 Of course sometimes a name can become associated in the public mind with 
something negative and call up negative associations. See Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1845 (2003) (discussing issue of, when a trademark or trade name becomes associated with 
negative information, whether it ought to be able to change its name). Phillip Morris and its 
affiliates changed their name to Altria, apparently in the hopes of disassociating the company 
from the negative connotations related to Phillip Morris and tobacco. 
http://www.altria.com/about_altria/1_0_AboutAltriaOver.asp (last visited on Feb. 5, 2006). 
84 Virginia Pharmacy is itself an example of this since its discussion uses the terms 
“commercial speech” and “advertising” as if they referred to the same thing. 
85 376 U.S. 254. 
86 Id. at 256−60 (describing contents of the ad). 
87 Id. at 266 (“The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense 
in which the word was used in Chrestensen.”). 
88 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67−68 (1983). 
89 Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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below. However, the protection the Court offered to commercial speech was 
based on these notions that the speech carried some “information” and that this 
information was of relevance to the proper functioning of the market. 
A. Advertising as “Information” 
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court essayed the following definition of 
advertising’s function: “Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it 
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”90 In 
the same opinion the Court suggested that commercial speech was speech that 
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”91 This latter definition 
may be a more general version of the first definition, but it still involves 
characterizing the speech as informational. Similarly, the Court in Central 
Hudson referred to the “informational function of advertising.”92 The 
proponents of expanded protection for commercial speech also take the position 
that advertising is information.93 
This characterization of advertising as performing an informational 
function crucial to the operation of the economy, progress, and perhaps even 
democracy itself was the position taken by many of the persons, such as J. 
Walter Thompson, George French, and Oscar Herzberg, who were some of the 
founders of the advertising profession.94 Herzberg, the managing editor of 
Printer’s Ink, the trade publication for the emergent advertising industry, wrote 
in 1899 that advertising was one of the “great developments of the century,”95 
“benefiting both seller and buyer by developing markets for the ‘hundreds of 
improvements and articles by which life can be made more pleasant.’”96 In the 
early part of the twentieth century, advertising’s promoters and practitioners 
seemed to believe there was virtually no limit to the positive social goods that 
could be attributed to advertising. By introducing products with which the 
public had not previously been familiar, advertising could introduce better 
 
90 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
765 (1976) (emphasis added). 
91 Id. at 771 n.24 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (striking down the segregation of want ads into “male” 
and “female” categories)). 
92  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
93 See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A 
Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1993); Alex 
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 
(1990); Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 
BROOK. L. REV. 437 (1980); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). 
94 See PAMELA WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE 
RISE OF CONSUMER MARKETING (1998). 
95 Id. at 338. 
96 Id. 
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habits to the public and thus it could perform an “educational” function.97 
Moreover, by stimulating desires, it stimulated the economy.98 Advertising, it 
was argued, also improved competition and thus made business more 
efficient.99 
“[W]hen twentieth-century advertising practitioners and their advocates set 
about attributing ‘civilizing and uplifting’ to advertising, they were quite in 
earnest about it.”100 But even then criticisms about the effectiveness of 
advertising, the potential for influencing the public in negative directions, 
concerns about advertising’s effectiveness if it were seen to be untruthful, and 
the advertisers’ willingness to exploit the “foibles” and “childishness”101 of the 
public, suggested that the “information” provided by advertising was not 
always necessarily beneficial to the public welfare. Nevertheless, the industry 
continued on a largely optimistic self-evaluation. During the 1920s and 1930s 
“ad creators . . . proudly proclaimed themselves missionaries of modernity.”102 
Although the 1930s saw the rise of consumer advocacy that manifested 
itself, among other ways, as truth-in-advertising and labeling regulation,103 the 
faith that advertising’s function was largely beneficent and contributed to a 
healthy economy continued to prevail. However, as the twentieth century 
progressed, advertisers increasingly moved away from reliance on persuading 
consumers through reasoning with them and presenting them with all the 
“information” or “reason-why” advertising, and toward methods of persuasion 
that stimulated emotional and unconscious reactions.104 Advertising that was 
identifiable as a “pitch” came to be seen as less persuasive, part of the hard 
sell.105 Instead, advertisers became interested in entertaining, in telling a story 
so that the selling message could be received as a sort of by-product, albeit a 
crucial one, of the ad. “[N]o one buys facts. They buy a story.” 106 
This picture, gleaned from advertising and marketing professionals, is 
much different than that proposed by the description of the “informational 
function” of advertising the Supreme Court identified in Virginia Pharmacy— 
speech that offers “information as to who is producing and selling what 
 
97 Id. at 354−58. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 347−48, 354. 
100 Id. at 355. 
101 Id. at 370. 
102 ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR 
MODERNITY 1920−1940 xxi (1985). 
103 LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION 
IN POSTWAR AMERICA 18−61 (2003). 
104 RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 72–73 (2d 
ed. 2005). 
105 “Advertising is taken for it is—a biased message paid for by a company with a 
selfish interest in what the consumer consumes.” RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 5. 
106 Seth Godin, The Storytellers, CMO MAG., June 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/060105/storytellers.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) 
(excerpt from SETH GODIN, ALL MARKETERS ARE LIARS (2005)). 
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product, for what reason, and at what price”107 or speech that does “no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”108 The actual advertising environment 
encompasses a much broader definition of information, much of it not, strictly 
speaking, informational if one requires truth to be a foundational requirement 
of what constitutes “information.” 
But that does not make it untrue either. In many cases it makes no sense to 
ask if an ad is “truthful” because it makes no claims. Much advertising is 
directed at creating images. Advertising is as much about creating perceptions 
as it is about conveying information. Indeed, with respect to the creation and 
maintenance of a brand, it is almost entirely about creating perceptions, 
perceptions that might not correspond to any “real” difference beyond the 
brand identity itself.109 “There’s a cardinal rule about choices in the 
marketplace that marketers often find difficult to accept: The physical 
properties of the goods are important only to the degree that they affect 
consumers’ perceptions!”110 
B. Advertising as Product Differentiation Through Emotional and Visual Appeals 
It is a fact of modern marketing that the marketing of a product consists of 
far more than simply a communication of the nature of the goods and their 
price, but includes the creation of all manner of associations, not all of them 
overt sales pitches, such as product placements in movies. Nevertheless, all of 
these activities are initiated with the intent of adding to the bottom line.111 That 
is what makes them marketing. And much advertising doesn’t explicitly say 
very much. Take, for example, Nike’s ad that appeared in the September 2004 
issue of Vanity Fair. It is a six-page full color spread of track and field athlete 
Marion Jones.112 The first page shows her face and no text. The remaining 
pages contain the following text: “Crowd noise. Not wanting to see the back of 
anyone’s [page break] head. A second skin more aerodynamic than your first. 
A call from Jackie Joyner-Kersee. Relative humidity. Your name yelled from 
the cheap seats. Not giving your [page break] rival the satisfaction of a ‘hello.’ 
You’re faster than you think.” 113 
 
107 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 765 (1976) (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at 771 n.24. 
109 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 643−46 & n.5 (1966) 
(holding that the marketing effects that created a consumer perception of difference between 
Borden milk marketed under its own label and that sold to be marketed under other private 
labels did not create a cognizable difference pursuant to the jurisdictional requirements of 
‘like grade and quality’ for purposes of Robinson-Patman Act). 
110 ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY THEY BUY: AMERICAN CONSUMERS 
INSIDE AND OUT 70 (1986) (emphasis in original omitted). 
111 See La Fetra, supra note 7, at 1231−36 (describing various marketing techniques 
that cannot be described as traditional advertising). Advertisers and marketers may not be 
able to draw a straight line of cause and effect between a particular ad and sales, but all such 
efforts are ultimately intended to generate positive economic results. 
112 Ad on file with the author. 
113 Id. 
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It is not entirely clear what is to be conveyed by chopping up the sentences 
across the pages (except maybe to keep one reading), but none of the text could 
really be described as “informational.” Rather, the text seems to be intended to 
inspire readers to identify with Ms. Jones, to imagine themselves as competitors 
and to put themselves in her place. Of course the easiest and quickest way for a 
reader to put herself in the place of the woman in the ad is to buy what she is 
wearing. But a message that can be loosely translated as “Buy our athletic 
shoes and clothing and you will be like (run as fast as?) Marion Jones”—if that 
is indeed the message114—is one that is immune from regulation for its 
misleading qualities because it would undoubtedly be categorized as mere 
“puffery” that no sensible person would believe.115 And of course no one would 
believe this message (or admit that they do). But as one advertising 
professional puts it, “[t]he purpose of advertising is to create desire beyond 
what the product can actually deliver.”116 Nike runs these ads because its 
executives believe that such ads will motivate people to buy their product. How 
they do so, or even whether they do so in fact, may be beside the point. 
A glance at any newspaper or magazine or a few minutes spent watching 
commercial television reveals that very little of what constitutes “traditional 
product advertising,” that is, media products that are recognizable as ads, is 
devoted to making explicit claims of any kind.117 This is one of the difficulties 
with enforcing the existing regulation of commercial advertising; its “message” 
is sufficiently ambiguous, vague, and impressionistic that it is fairly difficult to 
 
114 As Professor Richard Craswell has noted, “different consumers draw different 
inferences from the same commercial” and a single consumer may draw more than one bit of 
information from the same phrase. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 
B.U. L. REV. 657, 672 (1985). 
115 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brakes Prods. Liab. Litig., 966 F. 
Supp. 1525 (E.D. Mo. 1997), aff’d, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999) (consumers cannot 
reasonably believe a test supports a claim that anti-lock brakes are 99% more effective). 
“Simply stated, puffing is sales talk that the buyer should discount when making a 
transaction because no reasonable person under the circumstances would rely on the 
statement when contemplating a purchase.” Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *18−19 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999), vacated by Tylka v. Gerber 
Prods. Co., 211 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000). For more on the puffing doctrine, see David A. 
Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006) available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887720). 
116 Diann Daniel, Real Beauty = Real Sales?, CMO MAG., available at 
http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/current/real_beauty.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). 
117 The informational content may actually vary quite a bit depending on the type of 
advertising. For example, classified advertising is entirely informational. Some ads, for 
example diet products, may combine emotional appeals (photographs) with claims (Lose 10 
lbs in 2 weeks!). And some ads, like the Nike ad discussed, may make no explicit claims at 
all. Most information in traditional advertising, while subject to regulation, is also offered 
with various hedges in the form of disclaimers (“results may vary”). In addition, the puffing 
doctrine, low levels of funding and enforcement for the regulatory agencies involved, 
volume of complaints, etc., are such that even where there is an explicit claim that is alleged 
to be false, it is very likely that the advertiser will suffer no negative consequences as a 
result. For a discussion of some of the techniques to avoid liability in the context of 
testimonials, see The Problem with ‘True Stories,’ CONSUMER REPS., Jan. 2006, at 32−33. 
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simply establish what it “says,” let alone to establish whether that claim, 
assuming it isn’t found to be “puffing,” is truthful.118 
If it is not making a claim what is it doing? Clearly there is an attempt to 
generate sales. But the sale is at the end of a chain of associations and actions 
generated by those thoughts which perhaps did not actually begin with the ad, 
but are triggered by it. One element in this chain is the image or association that 
the viewer is left with, the feeling about the product or manufacturer, as well as 
how readily the name and look will be recalled at the time the buying decision 
is made. This is what advertisers are seeking to affect. One of the principal 
devices onto which these hopes are pinned is the brand. 
It is hard to imagine a concept that is emptier of real content in some sense 
and yet more significant to the manufacturer than the brand. Yet much 
advertising appears to be directed at creating this brand “identity” rather than at 
making any specific claims about product features, such as price, performance, 
or quality, the claims the Court in Virginia Pharmacy seemed to imagine were 
the usual content of advertising. Instead, much traditional advertising relates to 
brand identity. 
III. WHAT IS A BRAND? 
A brand is a perception in the prospect’s mind.119 
All sorts of things make up the image of a corporation that is then reflected 
in the brand identity. According to authors from the Kellogg School of 
Management at Northwestern, a brand is “‘a set of associations linked to a 
name, mark, or symbol associated with a product or service—a brand is much 
like a reputation.’”120 A company can itself be a brand, like Southwest Airlines, 
Starbucks, or Nike. In other cases, a company is the repository of a number of 
brand names, such as General Mills, which encompasses Old El Paso, 
Wheaties, Cheerios, and Betty Crocker, among other brands.121. And 
sometimes companies which house a number of related brands are themselves 
owned by a larger parent company. Brands are protected by a variety of 
devices, including trademarks and antitrust laws intended to prevent free riding 
on a brand by the development of similar marks that capitalize on the 
investments of competitors by using a similar mark or logo and hoping thereby 
to benefit by customer confusion.122 
 
118 Craswell, supra note 111, at 668−81. 
119 RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 85. 
120 The Last Word, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2005, at 99 (quoting from KELLOGG ON 
BRANDING (Alice M. Tybout & Tim Calkins, eds., 2005)) (alteration of quoted material in 
original). 
121 See  http://www.generalmills.com/corporate/brands/index.aspx (last visited May 6, 
2006). Notice that some of these brands are for one product (Wheaties) while others make a 
number of products under a particular label (Betty Crocker). 
122 See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004) (“orthodox justification for protecting trademarks” involves 
promoting market efficiency through reduced search costs for consumers, return on 
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But what these logos and images evoke in customers is not precisely 
informational. Rather it is often a feeling. “Consumers in the marketplace 
operate on the basis of the psychological and social images of the goods they 
buy.”123 “By pairing the brand name of the product with stimuli that naturally 
elicit positive emotional responses from people, over many repetitions, 
consumers learn to associate the brand with positive emotions. When they think 
of the brand they’ll have good feelings about it.”124 According to a vice 
president of marketing for Starbucks, “‘consumers don’t truly believe there’s a 
huge difference between products,’ which is why brands must ‘establish 
emotional ties’ with their customers through the ‘Starbucks Experience.’”125 
 “More and more of the currency of commerce is not goods, but 
information and even brand-loyalty itself.”126 And the “information” referred to 
is as much about the company and its practices as a whole as it is about the 
product itself. Prada or Coach can charge the prices that they do in part because 
what the consumer is buying is not just the materials and workmanship that 
went into the product127 but the idea of the product, its social meaning. 
As one marketing specialist puts it: 
Today’s most successful brands don’t just provide marks of distinction 
(identity) for product. Cult brands are beliefs. They have morals—
embody values. Cult brands stand up for things. They work hard; fight 
for what is right. Cult brands supply our modern metaphysics, imbuing 
the world with significance. We wear their meaning when we buy 
Benetton. We eat their meaning when we spoon Ben & Jerry’s into our 
mouths. . . . Brands function as complete meaning systems. They are 
venues for the consumer (and employee) to publicly enact a distinctive 
set of beliefs and values.128 
 
investment in advertising and preventing free-riding by competitors). See also Elizabeth 
Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 321 (1990), regarding the controversy over the question of the alleged anti-
competitive aspects of advertising and the move to regarding advertising and branding as 
promoting economic efficiency. 
123 SETTLE & ALRECK, supra note 110, at 128 (emphasis in original). 
124 Id. at 107. The authors describe this as “classical conditioning,” a revealing allusion 
to the genesis of these techniques in the experiments of Skinner and Pavlov. See id. at 
107−08 (chart of “learning modes”: association, classical conditioning, operant conditioning, 
modeling, and reasoning). That advertising is at least sometimes effective is hard to deny. 
See Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *37–42 
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) (plaintiffs suing Gerber over what they alleged were false advertising 
claims about the nutritional value of Gerber baby food couldn’t remember much about 
Gerber’s product claims from the ads except the name and that they trusted it, with one 
plaintiff testifying that when he thought of the name he got a “warm, fuzzy feeling”). 
125 NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 20 (1999). 
126 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687 (1999). 
127 In fact it is not by any means the case that there is a reliable correlation between 
price and quality of workmanship. 
128 DOUGLAS ATKIN, THE CULTING OF BRANDS: WHEN CUSTOMERS BECOME TRUE 
BELIEVERS 97 (2004). Although it might not be apparent from the title, the author is not 
writing a cautionary tale about the pernicious effects of brands. He is a marketing specialist 
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And a good deal of this social meaning is created by the advertising. 
However, not all of the image or social meaning is created by the advertising 
for the product. Much of it is created by what I call “free advertising,” that is, 
public relations and other marketing efforts. “Advertising any given product is 
only one part of branding’s grand plan, as are sponsorship and logo licensing. 
Think of the brand as the core meaning of the modern corporation, and of the 
advertisement as one vehicle used to convey that meaning to the world.”129 
That “core meaning of the modern corporation” is often conveyed through 
speech that relates to issues involving labor, the environment, animal testing, 
and any number of other issues that may affect the market’s perception of the 
company. And it is the whole market that is relevant—not just customers, but 
investors, employees, government regulators—everyone.130 And of course 
people aren’t neatly divided into one category or another. Categories overlap. 
For example, many employees are also investors and customers. 
Through what is known as “image advertising,” corporations attempt to 
create impressions about the corporation itself, to give the corporation a 
“personality” and create a “favorable attitude” toward the company.131 How 
people feel about a corporation or a brand may be far more significant than 
what they know. But what they feel is often created by what they think rather 
than what they know. Some part of the image promotion takes place as public 
relations and issue advertising, that is, advertising which takes a position on a 
 
whose premise is that marketers can learn from the techniques that cults use to engender 
loyalty to the cult to engender similar brand loyalty. As he puts it, “The position of this book 
is that cults are a good thing, that cults are normal, and that people join them for very good 
reasons.” Id. at xiv (emphasis in original). As with the Ries & Ries book, many of his case 
studies are clients, leading to the suspicion that the book’s principal function is to market his 
services. See RIES & RIES, supra note 2.  Of course this observation may merely serve to 
illustrate what some would describe as the edge of a slippery slope suggested by the 
argument here. If the book is promotional, what stops the government from regulating the 
content of books if promotional materials are commercial speech? The response is, I think, 
that if by “regulation” we mean the provision of damages for detrimental reliance on 
falsehoods, then such regulation already exists where the representations are sufficiently 
concrete as to provide a basis for damages. There is no inevitability to prior restraints on 
book publishers from the conclusion that false statements ought to be actionable in a 
marketing context. This would distinguish the situation presented, for instance, by the 
debacle surrounding the discovery that much of James Frey’s book, A Million Little Pieces, 
touted by Oprah Winfrey and almost instantly achieving best seller status, was false. See, 
e.g., Michael Granberry, ‘Pieces’ Fallout Continues, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 12, 2006. 
While some readers may have felt hurt and misled, and Frey admits that he made up parts to 
make the story more interesting (and thus presumably to sell more copies), he wasn’t, for 
example, promoting any addiction treatment services. So if someone had entered treatment 
upon reliance on his representations that turned out not to be true, he probably would not be 
liable since he wasn’t benefiting from the provision of those treatment services or paid to 
promote them.  
129 KLEIN, supra note 125, at 5 (emphasis added). 
130 Note that Atkin’s quote above supports this observation in that he references 
“employees” as well as “consumers.” See ATKIN, supra note 128. 
131 SHIMP, supra note 78, at 285 (quoting S. Prakash Sethi, Institutional/Image 
Advertising and Idea/Issue Advertising as Marketing Tools: Some Public Policy Issues, 43 J. 
MARKETING 68, 70 (1979)). 
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current issue of public interest. “When using issue advertising, a company takes 
a position on a controversial social issue of public importance with the 
intention of swaying public opinion.”132 And everything for-profit corporations 
say in the public sphere is presumptively related to the bottom line and related 
to profitability concerns.133 That includes, for example, comments about labor 
and environmental practices. 
A. Corporate Image as a Part of Marketing 
“Today, corporate advertising can be defined in terms of its purpose: to 
establish, alter or maintain the corporation’s identity.”134 Image advertising is 
intended to give a “personality” to a company. Thus, not only products, but 
“entire corporations could themselves embody a meaning of their own.”135 In 
this context then it seems to make sense to say a company is “radical,” “hip,” 
“traditional,” or “responsible.” Bennetton, Abercrombie & Fitch, Brooks 
Brothers, and Body Shop may each respectively be described as having a 
personality that is “radical,” “hip,” “traditional,” or “responsible.” These are the 
images these brands or companies136 have attempted to craft for themselves. 
And image advertising directed at creating feelings about the company actually 
works in both directions. That is, advertising meant to make the consumer “feel 
good” about the parent corporation could make him or her simultaneously feel 
good about its products or services. 
Although there is no clear consensus on what constitutes corporate image 
advertising it seems to have several facets, one part of which is sometimes 
separated out as “issue” advertising.137 Issue advertising involves 
representations about issues of public concern—the environment, labor 
practices, animal testing practices, and the like. But this information is not 
offered merely as a public service. As indicated above, it is offered because 
companies disseminating it believe (or more accurately, their representatives 
 
132 Id. at 286. A similar effort is described as “cause related marketing” where 
companies form alliances “with nonprofit organizations to promote their mutual interests. 
Companies wish to enhance their brands’ images and sales, whereas nonprofit partners 
obtain additional funding by aligning their causes with corporate sponsors.” Id. at 581 
(emphasis added). 
133 See Greenwood, supra note 17. See also Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s 
Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 458 (2003) (arguing that commercial advertising’s 
contribution to the so-called “marketplace of ideas” is distinctive because it is all aimed in 
the same direction, toward consumption). 
134 David Schumann, et al., Corporate Advertising In America: A Review of Published 
Studies on Use, Measurement, and Effectiveness, 20 J. ADVERTISING 35, 37 (1991). 
135 KLEIN, supra note 125, at 7. 
136 For purposes of the consuming audience it often doesn’t matter if a brand is really a 
free-standing company or part of a conglomerate. It is often part of the branding strategy to 
keep the brand visible but not to brand the parent company, or to have separate brand 
identities for subsidiary and parent. 
137 See, e.g., C.C. Laura Lin, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 462−67 (1988) (describing the multiple purposes of corporate image 
advertising, all of which, despite the author’s observation regarding their mixed impact, have 
a single aim—increasing corporate welfare, that is the company’s economic success). 
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believe) that it will affect the bottom line. “Corporate image advertising is 
directed at more than merely trying to make consumers feel good about a 
company. Companies are increasingly using the image of their firms to enhance 
sales and financial performance. Corporate advertising that does not contribute 
to increased sales and profits is difficult to justify.”138 These practices are an 
integral part of what the consumer sees as “the product” and contribute to what 
they view as the corporation’s image. “Information about the relations of 
production is as important as information about the performance features of the 
objects of production.”139 
B. Nike as a Case Study 
For many years Nike has been criticized for its labor practices.140 Many 
critics have accused Nike of subcontracting its manufacturing processes to 
“sweatshops” in Southeast Asia. As a consequence an anti-Nike “no 
sweatshops” grassroots campaign began on college campuses to question the 
lucrative contracts that Nike has with college athletic teams to be “Nike 
teams.”141 These contracts mean hundreds of thousands of dollars to the 
colleges that sign them and provide Nike with what it apparently views as 
important visibility and indeed even endorsements.142 Nike also has (or has 
had) lucrative endorsement deals with prominent sports figures such as Michael 
Jordan and Tiger Woods to wear its clothing and to do ads endorsing it.143 
 
138 SHIMP, supra note 78, at 285−86 (emphasis added). 
139 SUT JHALLY, THE CODES OF ADVERTISING: FETISHISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF MEANING IN THE CONSUMER SOCIETY 24 (1990). 
140 For examples of some of the critiques of Nike, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. 
Skover, Foreword: The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 968−71 (2004). Interestingly enough, by 2005 Nike’s 
reputation was almost completely resuscitated as it was listed 31st in Business Ethics’ 100 
Best Companies for 2005. Business Ethics Magazine, What’s New, http://www.business-
ethics.com/whats_new/100best_2005.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). 
141 See, e.g., Global Exchange, About Global Exchange, http://www.globalexchange.or 
g/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (describing mission as including fighting 
sweatshop labor conditions and specifically naming Nike); Just Do It!: The Nike Boycott 
Spreads Across Alberta, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5232/ (last visited Feb. 
28, 2006); Sweatshop Watch Newsletter, Summer 2001, Resources, http://www.sweatshop 
watch.org/media/pdf/newsletters/7_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting on Global 
Exchange’s Just Do It! proposed boycott of Nike). See also First Amended Complaint at 
21−22, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., No. 994446 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 2, 1998) (describing a 
demonstration on February 22, 1997 in San Francisco protesting the opening of a Niketown 
store). 
142 First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 5−6. Of course, as it is increasingly 
the case that both sides of the field are “Nike teams,” it may be less significant to endorse a 
winner. 
143 “Air Jordan”, named after basketball star Michael Jordan, is a sub-brand of Nike 
footwear. See, e.g., Nikebiz, Air Jordan’s New Runway, http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/ 
pressrelease.jhtml?year=1999&month=03&letter=b (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). Nike named a 
building after Tiger Woods. Nikebiz, Tiger Woods Christens State-of-the-Art Conference 
Center on Nike World Campus (May 25, 2001), http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/pressre 
lease.jhtml?year=2001&month=05&letter=l (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
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When criticism of its labor practices began to emerge, some of Nike’s athletic 
stars were quoted as promising to “look into” the allegations about Nike and 
sweatshops.144 So these grassroots campaigns combined with lots of negative 
press meant Nike had to roll into action. 
And roll it did. It launched an aggressive public relations campaign. It 
hired Andrew Young to conduct a supposed fact-finding tour of its factories 
and then commissioned a report from that tour, the positive points of which 
found their way into press releases.145 Its employees wrote letters to the editor 
confirming Nike’s commitment to fair labor practices.146 It drafted a “Code of 
Conduct” and then issued press releases with a copy of the Code of Conduct 
indicating that it made its subcontractors sign the Code and agree to be bound 
by it. It issued press releases purporting to respond to the allegations.147 It 
wrote letters making similar statements and commitments to college and 
university presidents and athletic directors.148 And its chief executive, Phil 
Knight, spoke publicly about Nike’s commitment to fair labor practices, an 
adequate wage, and safe working conditions. He claimed that “you’ll find air 
quality better [in our plants] than it is in Los Angeles.”149 
There was just one problem. Allegedly many of these statements were 
either misleading or simply not true. Marc Kasky, a citizen and activist in 
California, filed a law suit claiming that Nike’s statements violated California’s 
unfair trade practices and false advertising laws. He was not seeking damages 
for himself. Rather he was suing under the then “private attorney general” 
provision of the California false advertising and unfair competition statutes that 
permitted any citizen to launch such claims on behalf of the public.150 Kasky 
claimed that the above statements were made to boost the reputation of Nike, to 
preserve its lucrative contractual arrangements, and ultimately, thereby, to 
boost flagging sales. To the extent then that these statements were not true, 
Kasky claimed they represented a fraud on the public. Nike categorized them as 
free speech on issues of public concern, namely “globalization,” and filed a 
demurrer to his complaint. Nike’s position was that if its customers were 
concerned about such matters, they were concerned as a “moral” matter and 
such moral matters were not subject to governmental purview. Nike claimed it 
 
144 Kasky’s lawsuit alleged that Reggie White had called for Nike to relocate its 
manufacturing in the U.S. and that Michael Jordan had indicated that he would “see it for 
[him]self” about the conditions in Nike’s factories and if the working conditions were as 
alleged by the critics Nike should “revise its situation.” First Amended Complaint, supra 
note 137, at 7−8. 
145 Id. at 21−24. 
146 Id. at 10 (letter to the editor of Lee Weinstein, Nike’s Director of Communications); 
Phillip H. Knight, Letter to the Editor, Nike Pays Good Wages to Foreign Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jun. 21, 1996, at A26. 
147 First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 19. 
148 Id. at 9−10. See also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 685–86 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (appendix presenting one such letter). 
149 First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 16. 
150 It is surely no coincidence that California, after heavy corporate lobbying, passed 
Proposition 64 which eliminated the private attorney general provision from the statute. See 
Piety, Grounding Nike, supra note 8, at 195 n.256 (discussing Proposition 64). 
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should have an absolute and unfettered right to say whatever it wished in this 
context.151 
But of course, as explored above, all of these matters, whether or not they 
were “moral” concerns for consumers, were commercial concerns for Nike. It 
is for these reasons that Nike’s claims about its labor practices, practices that go 
into the manufacture of Nike clothing and shoes, are no less a “real” component 
of the product than the brand name itself, which Nike spent close to a billion 
dollars promoting in the year prior to the filing of the complaint in the Kasky 
lawsuit.152 So it cannot be that when Nike issued press releases about its labor 
practices it was not speaking to its “commercial” interests. Obviously it was. 
That attitude is reflected in a letter to the editor by Nike’s Director of 
Communication Lee Weinstein that was published in the San Francisco 
Examiner: 
Consumers are savvy and want to know that they support companies with 
good products and practices. . . . During the shopping season, we 
encourage shoppers to remember that NIKE is the industry’s leader in 
improving factory conditions. Consider that Nike established the sporting 
goods industry’s first code of conduct to ensure our workers know and 
can exercise their rights.153 
Of course it may not be saying much to claim to be the “industry leader” if 
the industry’s practices are generally abysmal. And establishing a code of 
conduct doesn’t mean enforcing it or distributing it to workers. These were the 
sorts of objections, and more, that the Kasky lawsuit raised. 
Kasky claimed that documents such as Weinstein’s letter to the editor were 
performing a marketing function. The aim in publishing this letter, or a “Code 
of Conduct,” was to improve the public perception of Nike’s practices, and 
thereby consumer behavior, without actually having to do anything about 
changing these practices. Because Nike knew consumers cared about these 
issues, it wanted to assure them that it did too without actually having to incur 
the costs that would be associated with making the changes that consumers 
were seeking. The plaintiff, Kasky, claimed this constituted a fraud on 
consumers. And if his allegations were true, it is difficult to understand why it 
would not be a fraud on consumers.154 If the speaker knows and assumes that 
such statements will influence consumer behavior and intends to influence 
behavior through reliance on the statements’ truth, then it seems fraudulent to 
 
151 I have characterized this elsewhere as asking for a right to lie. For a detailed 
exploration of that claim and of the Nike case generally, see Piety, Grounding Nike, supra 
note 8. 
152 First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 5. 
153 Id. at 10. 
154 It cannot be over-emphasized that whether this is an accurate reflection of what the 
letter said, whether the statements were true or false, etc., were all matters of fact which were 
to be subject to proof and resolution at the trial and that Nike’s position, in filing a demurrer, 
was that the truth didn’t matter. Nike claimed it was entitled to legal protection for these 
statements even if it had made them with the intent to influence shoppers and with full 
knowledge. 
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make these statements where that information is untrue or misleading. As 
Professor Douglas Kysar puts it: 
Rather than being scientifically unfounded, nakedly protectionist, or 
ethically inconsistent, consumer process preferences instead offer an 
important vehicle through which individuals influence the world, express 
their views on public issues, and fashion their moral identity in an era of 
extraordinary interconnectedness, complexity, and dynamism in the 
market. 155 
This consumer concern for issues that Professor Kysar labels “process” should, 
theoretically, be no less a part of product “quality” or “characteristics” than 
whether a product is a “real” Prada bag or a knock off. Although Nike argued 
that “no one contends that [its] statements misled consumers about the 
characteristics of Nike products,”156 this is precisely what Kasky alleged 
insofar as he argued that the “characteristic” at stake was whether Nike’s 
products were the product of unfair labor practices and that Nike misled, or 
intended to mislead, consumers on this point. Why should the company’s labor 
practices be any less a “characteristic” of the product than its association with 
Marion Jones? 
Certainly labor practices are a characteristic that is of interest to many 
consumers. And as Professor Kysar points out, it is one that appears to allow 
consumers the feeling of meaningful participation in issues that contribute to 
more than simply their own satisfaction.157 “[R]ather than waiting for post-
market wealth transfers and ameliorative environmental, health, and safety 
regulations, consumers . . . instead express preferences for sustainable, 
equitable outcomes through their market purchases ab initio.”158 However, their 
ability to actually make such choices effectively depends on their ability to 
receive accurate information on which to make such decisions. If the 
information received is not reliable on the topics about which the public is 
interested in basing their economic decisions, then those decisions are unlikely 
to affect such practices. Indeed, even if such decisions are collectively 
effective, if the companies successfully persuade consumers that they are not, 
that the problem is “too big” to be addressed by their individual purchasing 
decisions, it may discourage further attempts to effect real change through 
consumption. 
As noted above, the information regarding such issues as labor practices is 
directly related to the corporation’s welfare. It is unclear why that welfare 
should trump the desire by consumers for accurate information on these topics. 
 
155 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 624 (2004). 
156 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 
02-575) (emphasis added). 
157 Professor Kysar notes that this other-directed component of consumption is one that 
appears to contradict a “neoliberal view of the world” that focuses almost exclusively on 
individual welfare maximization. See Kysar, supra note 155, at 635. See also COHEN, supra 
note 100, at 388−97. 
158 Kysar, supra note 155, at 636. 
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[B]ecause corporations are entities whose decision makers owe fiduciary 
duties to shareholders and owners, no responsible corporate spokesman 
speaks on the company’s behalf without being concerned about the 
effects the statements may have on corporate sales and profits. . . . [A]ll 
corporate speech is, and should be, uttered in the interests of benefitting 
the corporation in the eyes of potential consumers. . . .159 
This was the argument offered by the various public relations professionals in 
support of Nike. And it is consistent with the dominant legal theory of the 
legitimacy of corporate action as described by professors Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman. “There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder 
value.”160 It is hard to improve on the public relations professional’s own 
statements about the nature of speech by corporations. However, the authors of 
this quote in support of Nike seemed to think that aspect of corporate speech 
strengthened the argument for protecting it rather than weakening it. 
However, saying that there isn’t any corporate speech that isn’t calculated 
to improve or protect long-term shareholder value is not the same thing as 
saying that whatever the corporation says in aid of protecting shareholder value 
is necessarily in the public interest. And it most certainly is not necessarily 
information. If it is possible to assert that a corporation follows a particular 
practice that the public finds laudable or attractive, but without assuming the 
additional costs associated with following that practice, it would seem 
axiomatic that a corporation not only would have an incentive to do so, it 
would have a duty to do so. The only mechanism standing in the way of that 
practice that would not only arguably preclude a corporation from engaging in 
this sort of speech/practice, but provide it with a legitimate basis for declining 
to do so, would seem to be a legal regime in which it could ultimately cost the 
corporation more to fail to honor its public pledges than one in which it was the 
better practice to avoid fulfilling them. 
To be sure, the existence of a legal proscription for a particular practice is 
no guarantee that the proscription will be observed where there is a strong 
financial incentive to violate the law. The trade in illegal drugs flourishes, as 
does corporate misconduct with regard to a variety of antitrust, securities, or 
other regulatory matters.161 Still, unless we are prepared to concede that the 
 
159 Brief for Arthur W. Page Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra 
note 17, at 18−19. 
160 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). For a thoughtful and thorough critique of what the authors call the 
“meta-script” from which statements such as this emanate, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, 
The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
161 See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Parke-Davis, Division of Warner-Lambert, 
No. 96-11651-PBS (D. Mass. 2001) (alleging various violations of the criminal law related 
to Warner-Lambert’s marketing of the drug Neurontin for off-label uses). Pursuant to a plea 
agreement the company pled guilty to several of the charges “expressly and unequivocally 
admit[ting] that it committed the crimes charged in the Information.” See Letter from 
Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Robert B. Fiske & James P. Rouhandeh (May 
13, 2004), available at http://news.findlaw/nytimes/docs/pfizer/usw51304plea.pdf. See 
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criminal and civil regulatory regime is of no force in the corporate decision-
making process, it would seem that the existence of a legal regime prohibiting 
false statements for the purposes of boosting corporate image or sales or 
responding to criticisms would represent some sort of reinforcement for the 
behavior the government would like to encourage. 
And there is some support for this observation in the post-litigation 
conduct of Nike itself. Although Nike and many of its supporters ominously 
opined that “news” sources would dry up in the face of potential liability162 
because corporations would no longer be willing to issue press releases, in fact, 
as predicted long ago by the Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy, it appears 
that the robustness of the incentives to speak far outweigh the specter of 
liability for misstatements163 because Nike has continued to make statements 
about its labor practices and indeed has expanded its commentary despite the 
fact that the objectionable California Supreme Court ruling is still, at this 
printing, good law164 And Nike is not alone. It is now commonplace for 
companies to issue social responsibility statements, to publicize their efforts to 
engage in environmentally sound practices, to publicize benefits to employees, 
and other process-related concerns that roughly fall into the category of 
corporate social responsibility. 
This practice is not without its critics. Many argue that there is little 
consensus about what constitutes social responsibility and little in the way of 
standardized measurements for assessing social responsibility, leaving 
corporations somewhat adrift as to how to meaningfully contribute. Recently 
The Economist saw fit to weigh in against the practice of corporate 
 
United States v. Microsoft: Settlement Information, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-
settle.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
162 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 39 (indicating that Nike had declined to 
participate in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and has turned down “dozens of 
invitations . . . to speak on corporate responsibility issues” out of the fear of liability in 
California should any of its statements be deemed false and misleading). See also Chris 
Atkins, Where’s A Cop When You Need One? (2003), http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache 
:U3wyYw8w16MJ:www.ketchum.com/DisplayWebPage/0,1003,1973,00.html+wheres+a+c
op+when+you+need+one&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1.  Ketchum, a public relations firm, 
suggests that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Kasky had implications that “could 
be quite broad for anyone who makes a living in PR.” 
163 “Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood 
of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). 
164 See Jason A. Cade, If the Shoe Fits: Kasky v. Nike and Whether Corporate 
Statements About Business Operations Should Be Deemed Commercial Speech, 70 BROOK. 
L. REV. 247, 270 (2004) (“In spite of repeated threats to discontinue providing any 
information about its factory conditions should it lose its litigation with California activist 
Mark Kasky, Nike now provides more extensive information related to the working 
conditions in its factories on its website that it did before the suit settled.”). Nike issued its 
first Corporate Social responsibility statement in 2001. See Nikebiz,  Nike Releases First 
Corporate Responsibility Report (Oct. 9, 2001), http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/press 
release.jhtml?year=2001&month=10&letter=e. 
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responsibility as a legitimate corporate function on these very grounds.165 In 
addition, the objection was made that managers aren’t really trained to engage 
in social engineering. It is best to leave them to do what they do best—running 
their businesses—and leave governmental functions to legislators.166 
Presumably that criticism extends to advertising and publicity about corporate 
social responsibility. 
C. Advertising: From Economic Waste to Value Added 
For a good part of the twentieth century, the consensus opinion among 
economists, law makers, and legal scholars seemed to be that advertising 
dollars that were directed primarily at product differentiation, that is, branding 
such as identified above, particularly in the context of identical products, for 
example, household bleach, represented an economic waste because it did not 
relate any real information to consumers and was actually of negative value to 
consumers since the expense generated by such product differentiation attempts 
was passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 167 
Since there is no reason (save cheapness and availability) for a consumer 
to prefer one brand of liquid bleach over another, there is no real need for 
the various manufacturers to incur as heavy advertising expenses as they 
do—except to protect their market shares . . . we have a situation in 
which heavy advertising benefits the consumer, who pays for such 
advertising in the form of a higher price for the product, not at all.168 
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion with respect to whether the 
Robinson-Patman Act prohibited price differentials between milk Borden sold 
to be marketed as a house or “private” brand, and sales of the same milk under 
the Borden label, where the only discernable differences in the product were 
those associations created by the advertising. 169 The majority was of the 
 
165 Editorial, The Good Company: A Skeptical Look at Corporate Responsibility, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 11 (criticizing much in the way of corporate social 
responsibility as “pernicious benevolence”). 
166 There is some good evidence that legislators are themselves contracting out their 
responsibilities with regard to drafting legislation by accepting wholesale legislative 
proposals from lobbying groups.  See Wendy Higgins, Ghostwriting Legislation: The New 
“Non-Profits” that Write Many State Laws (unpublished student manuscript, on file with 
author) (describing the practice of lobbyists writing legislation that then is adopted verbatim 
by legislators). 
167  Mensch & Freeman, supra note 118, at 326−29 (quoting Commissioner Elman’s 
opinion with respect to Clorox’s merger with Proctor & Gamble to the effect that since all 
bleach was chemically identical and thus there were no rational reasons for advertising, from 
the consumer information standpoint, except to protect market share on the basis of this 
unreal difference, such advertising was wasteful, anticompetitive, and ultimately harmful to 
consumers since it increased the price to consumers). See also Ralph S. Brown, Advertising 
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1173 (1948) 
(describing advertising directed at product differentiation for similar products as often 
profitable for the companies involved but increasing costs and thus not involving 
competition in the “economically useful sense of the word”). 
168 In re Proctor & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1581−82 (1963) (emphasis added). 
169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 645−46 (1966). 
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opinion that the “like grade or quality” test in the Act should not encompass the 
expenditures made regarding brand differentiation or different consumer 
attitudes created thereby.170 Justice White writing for the majority noted, “The 
dissent would exempt the effective advertiser from the Act. We think Congress 
intended to remit him to his defenses under the Act, including that of cost 
justification.”171 And the enormous expenditures of the largest companies can 
still be seen, practically if not legally, as economic barriers to entry for 
competitors.172 
However, in the seventies the consensus shifted, at least in some areas, to 
the position that: 
There is no way to distinguish qualities of a product attributable to image 
alone (hence misleading and wasteful) from qualities attributable to 
“real” difference—for example, lower price, better quality, or easier 
availability. Given the impossibility of making that distinction – one 
which necessarily entailed a normative judgment about the social value 
of advertising—consumer “preference” as registered on the existing 
market must prevail.173 
That capitulation to the view that advertising “created” something has 
always been somewhat controversial in that there was some suspicion that 
empirical support was lacking for the association between the expenditure by a 
corporation on advertising dollars and the receipt of something of value, 
particularly increased sales attributable to those expenditures.174 “[C]hances are 
that neither the client nor the [ad] agency will ever know very much about what 
role the ad has played in sales or profits of the client, either short term or long-
term.”175 Or as a running joke in the industry has it, “I know half of my 
advertising money is being wasted. I just don’t know which half.”176 But one of 
the reasons advanced for this problem of attribution of effectiveness is that 
advertising lacks credibility. “Advertising has no credibility. Advertising is not 
believable because consumers perceive it to be biased. Advertising is the voice 
of the seller.”177 The solution? Put the advertising message in the hands of a 
third party the public perceives as neutral—the media. “The essence of public 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 645 n.6. 
172 “[I]t is marketing investments like this one [Gatorade’s investments in its NFL 
connection] that make it virtually impossible for Powerade or All-Sport to ever overtake the 
sports-drink king of the NFL hill.” Id. at 227. 
173 Id. at 337. 
174 “The simple fact is that traditional advertising isn’t working very well.” RIES & 
RIES, supra note 2, at 85. The authors devote an entire chapter in this book to reviewing case 
studies of celebrated advertising campaigns that nevertheless did not generate sales. Id. at 
49−59 (“Advertising and Sales”). See also SHIMP, supra note 78, at 228−29 (discussing 
arguments for “disinvesting in advertising” relating to established brands). But see 
Schumann, et al., supra note 134 (surveying published studies and concluding, with some 
caveats, that corporate image and issue advertising had been “successful in encouraging 
financially-related goals”). 
175 SCHUDSON, supra note 1, at 85. 
176 Id. (paraphrasing quote with various attributions). 
177 RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 75. 
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relations is to verbalize the brand in a way that encourages the media to run 
stories about the product or service.”178 “In light of how difficult it is now to 
raise advertising awareness above the noise of so many competitive messages, 
marketers are turning increasingly to product publicity as an important adjunct 
to advertising.”179 
IV. WHAT IS PUBLIC RELATIONS? 
If one were to ask the man often dubbed “the father of public relations,”180 
Edward L. Bernays, “What is public relations?” he would have said it is the 
profession intended to facilitate communication. In his influential book, 
Propaganda, Bernays noted: 
If we accept public relations as a profession, we must also expect it to 
have ideals and ethics. The ideal of the profession is a pragmatic one. It is 
to make the producer, whether that producer be a legislature making laws 
or a manufacturer making a commercial product, understand what the 
public wants and to make the public understand the objectives of the 
producer.181 
In Bernays’ view, one of the chief features of democracy, modernity, and 
industrialization in a country the size of the United States was that it was 
necessary for society to be guided by what he called “the invisible 
government.”182 “Propaganda,” he wrote, “is the executive arm of the invisible 
government.”183 This invisible government was necessary according to Bernays 
because, in order for the theory of competitive markets to work in the face of 
the reality of a surfeit of information and a tendency for people therefore to 
follow tastemakers, those “minorities” who actually acted as the governors 
needed a device to “mold the mind of the masses [so] that they will throw their 
newly gained strength in the desired direction.”184 
 
178 Id. at 246. 
179 FRASER P. SEITEL, THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 228 (8th ed. 2001). 
180 See, e.g., LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS AND THE BIRTH OF 
PUBLIC RELATIONS viii (1998) (“Edward Bernays almost single-handedly fashioned the craft 
that has come to be called public relations.”). 
181 EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 69 (Ig Publ’g 2005) (1928). 
182 Id. at 47−48. 
183 Id. at 48. Of course it may be the executive arm of the visible government as well. 
Certainly the government has made liberal use of public relations techniques to get across its 
“message.” See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Public Relations Campaign for Research Office at 
E.P.A. May Include Ghostwritten Articles, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 18, 2005, at A16. 
184 See BERNAYS, supra note 177, at 47. Even if he would not necessarily agree with 
some of the ethical decisions of current practitioners, one cannot help but think Bernays 
might have smiled in spite of himself had he read the following critique of the public 
relations business. “The power of the PR industry is demonstrated not only by its hegemonic 
manoeuvrings within and for every area of government and business, but also by its 
remarkable ability to function as a virtually invisible ‘grey eminence’ behind the scenes, 
gliding in and out of troubled situations with the ease of a Cardinal Richelieu and the 
conscience of a mercenary.” JOYCE NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE: PUBLIC RELATIONS AND 
THE MEDIA 19 (1989). 
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Although there was no PR industry as such at the time, the history of 
public relations perhaps begins with Andrew Jackson’s notorious aide, Amos 
Kendall, credited with being the first to engage in the news “leak” as well as 
conducting many of the activities which today would be the job of the 
president’s press secretary, and showman P.T. Barnum.185 Bernays and a 
former Wall Street reporter, Ivy Ledbetter Lee,186 began the job of 
professionalizing and formalizing the training and practice for the business that 
came to be known as public relations. 
Lee began his career assisting businesses to communicate following a 
period of public criticisms of business from journalists who became known as 
“muckrakers.” “For Lee, the key to business acceptance and understanding was 
that The Public Be Informed.”187 According to his Declaration of Principles, 
sent out to newspaper editors, his practice would be to communicate with the 
press “frankly and openly” on behalf of his clients.188 However, his technique 
did not rely entirely on sending out “frank and open” press releases and 
responding honestly to press inquiries. It also involved touches of the showman 
P.T. Barnum. Lee would arrange for press coverage of events intended to 
“humanize” clients like the Rockefellers by offering the press human interest 
and family angles to cover, showing “them in real-life situations such as 
playing golf, attending church, and celebrating birthdays.”189 
Today, public relations practice covers a range of activities that is so broad 
that it is difficult to summarize. “[W]ell-worn tactics include calling a press 
conference, pitching stories directly to journalists, arranging eye-catching 
events, setting up interviews and handing out free samples.”190 Certainly a 
feature of the practice is the crafting of press releases and the attempt to catch 
the attention of the media to carry the “news” thus released as a story with the 
byline of the reporter, thereby lending automatic credibility to a message that 
might otherwise be dismissed as obviously biased. But public relations is far 
more than press releases. It also involves scheduling activities that keep the 
client in the posture of making news and spreading the message. So it includes 
scheduling executives to appear on panels at conferences,191 before legislative 
bodies, and on television and radio. Increasingly, it means preparing and 
maintaining a website that is in effect an extended advertisement for the 
company by providing information (although obviously principally that 
information that will put the company in a positive light) as well as creating 
opportunities, such as through contests and interactive features, to engage 
visitors with its products or services in some way. 
 
185 SEITEL, supra note 175, at 27−29. 
186 Id. at 30.  Seitel calls Ivy Lee “the real father of modern public relations.” 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 31. 
190 Do We Have a Story for You!, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 57. 
191 The author was recently on a panel at the University of Miami School of 
Communications on March 31, 2006, for “Communications Week” about the Nike case 
along with Vada Manager, a Nike employee. 
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Public relations practice is also not limited to the for-profit sector. It is a 
key part of governmental policy, albeit much criticized when it appears that a 
story is all “spin” and no substance.192 But even in the for-profit sector, public 
relations firms are deeply involved in lobbying and the apparently 
indispensable job of conducting public opinion surveys. It is obvious why 
companies perceive lobbying to be a good investment. Legislatures pass laws 
that may directly influence the bottom line.193 It is often also the public 
relations firm that may advise management of the advisability of expansion into 
new markets or new lines on the basis of such surveys. They may coordinate 
what have been dubbed “Astroturf campaigns” intended to influence legislation 
which involve recruiting persons (sometimes with deceptive practices) to 
participate in letter writing campaigns or other demonstrations which suggest 
public support.194 Public relations practitioners may also craft “advertorials” for 
traditional ad placement. They often have a role in creating non-profit research 
or opinion organizations through which opinions favorable to the industry 
client can be funneled without a direct connection to the client. 
For many marketing professionals, public relations is a clear subset of 
marketing efforts and ought to be driven by the marketing objectives of a 
company—hence the term “integrated marketing communications,” or IMC.195 
“In a 2004 review of the state of IMC, the authors concluded that, ‘IMC has 
swept the world and become the accepted norm of businesses and apparently 
the agencies that service their needs. . . .’”196 Not only is PR a key part of 
marketing for the for-profit enterprise, according to influential PR writers Al 
 
192 See, e.g., Stuart Elliot, A Undisclosed Paid Endorsement Ignites a Debate in the 
Public Relations Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at C2 (reporting on disclosure that the 
Department of Education paid conservative commentator Armstrong Williams $240,000 to 
write columns supporting the Administration’s program No Child Left Behind); Frank Rich, 
Enron: Patron Saint of Bush’s Fake News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, § 2, at 1 (critiquing 
the Bush administration’s screening of the audience in the Social Security program tour 
“conversations” and discussing the administration’s payment of journalists through 
lobbyists); Frank Rich, Op-Ed, One Step Closer to the Big Enchilada, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
2005, Week in Review, at 12 (claiming the Bush administration engages in a practice of 
creating an “alternate reality built on spin and outright lies”). See also Gia B. Lee, 
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005) 
(critiquing governmental use of the public relations practice of attempting to influence policy 
through planting news stories, influencing television drama scripts, influencing counseling 
received from doctors, and other similar techniques as undermining the legitimacy of the 
communications, and advocating greater transparency). 
193 It is even better if you can write the law and get your version adopted by the 
legislature. See Wendy Higgins, “Ghostwriting the Law”: Who’s Writing the Law Anyway? 
(essay on file with author). 
194 STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 29, at 79. 
195 However, not all public relations professionals agree. Some argue that “PR includes 
public affairs, issues management, crisis communication, community relations and employee 
relations—all of which, I believe, are only marginally related to marketing.” Integrated 
Marketing: Is it PR Nemesis or Salvation?, O’DWYER’S PR SERVICES REPORT (Jan. 1995). 
This remark was made in 1995. Judging from current marketing literature, that battle has 
largely been lost. See infra note 196. 
196 Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 93. 
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and Laura Ries, “PR is in the driver’s seat and should lead and direct a 
marketing program.”197 Moreover, as noted in the title of this piece, “in 
comparison with many other types of marketing, PR is cheap.”198 If you can get 
the media to carry your message it is free. Furthermore, as Ries and Ries argue, 
“[p]ublicity provides the credentials that create credibility in the 
advertising.”199 “PR has credibility, advertising does not. People believe what 
they read in newspapers or magazines or what they hear on the radio or see on 
television.”200 They may believe it, but perhaps they should not. 
The principal thrust of PR is to change the perception. As Ries and Ries 
say, “perception is everything.” At the end of the day, the consequences to the 
bottom line may be as beneficial (if not more beneficial) to the company that 
manages to change the perceptions without changing the practices, as it would 
be to change the practices as well as the perceptions. An example of the overt 
use of this technique is the Nestlé corporation’s attempt to address its public 
relations problems stemming from its sales of infant formula in the Third 
World by initiating a campaign to set up a fund called “Carnation Care” to 
benefit HIV-infected children.201 Its PR firm, Olgivy & Mather, proposed a 
number of potential “feel good” campaigns to “inoculate” the company from 
the negative ramifications that its practices regarding infant formula sales in the 
Third World were generating before the “Carnation Care” campaign was 
chosen.202 Unfortunately for Nestlé, the details of that campaign were leaked to 
the press before it began, thus undermining the program’s potential 
effectiveness.203 Of course whether it contributed to aid for HIV-infected 
infants is not, in some sense, germane to whether its practices in selling infant 
formula were acceptable. But it was clear the company hoped to be able to 
change its image without changing its practices.204 
But the discussion between the firm’s representatives and Nestlé’s 
representatives illustrate some of the problem. It is not entirely clear that for the 
practitioners of PR, acid rain, for example, is anything other than a PR 
problem. The problem is the discipline may encourage a mindset that equates 
improving the public perception of a problem with actually addressing the 
problem. And of course, as explored above, this is partly because, from the 
perspective of the client, the problem is the perception. So if it is possible to 
cure the perception without incurring the additional expenditures that may be 
associated with actually addressing the problem, there is a strong incentive to 
 
197 RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at xii. 
198 Do We Have a Story for You!, supra note 190, at 57. 
199 REIS & RIES, supra note 2, at xix. 
200 Id. at 85. 
201 NELSON, supra note 184, at 13−15. 
202 Id. at 14. The parade of proposals, including “Carnation Combats Cocaine,” would 
be comical were it not for the seriousness of the issues and the distastefulness of using them 
in this way. 
203 Id. 
204 After temporarily ceasing sales of infant formula in response to criticism, Nestlé 
resumed the practice. Id. at 13. 
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do so. That may encourage a mindset in which truth becomes irrelevant. That is 
a problem—particularly when there is a crisis. 
The public relations department is where clients turn when things go 
wrong. The paradigmatic case is the response of Johnson & Johnson to the 
poisoning deaths of consumers in Chicago in 1982 when it appeared that 
persons unknown had tampered with some Tylenol by lacing it with cyanide. 
The Johnson & Johnson case is often lauded as a textbook case of the 
appropriate responsible corporate response to a crisis.205 However, according to 
some, this version of the Johnson & Johnson response is itself an example of 
PR at work because the Johnson & Johnson response was anything but 
exemplary. Jack O’Dwyer, a public relations authority and publisher of a 
newsletter for the profession, asserts that in fact Johnson & Johnson took eight 
days to respond with a recall, less time than it took for the stores to remove the 
product from their shelves.206 According to O’Dwyer, “J&J was just another 
case of normal corporate foot-dragging during a crisis”207 and that PR 
professors “have to ‘unteach’ the Tylenol episode because so many of their 
students are ill-informed about it.”208 Perhaps it is the journalism students who 
most need to be “untaught.” 
In any event, crises continue to emerge, as of course they will—from the 
Exxon Valdez spill209 to the General Motors and Goodyear tire issue, the Vioxx 
recall210 to Wal-Mart labor practices211—the public relations people are often 
the first responders. When that information is not accurate, the possibility for 
harm seems obvious. But the harm is not limited to the response to isolated 
crises. As discussed above, consumers care about and sometimes respond to 
process issues. If they are misinformed on these process issues, then the market 
is misled. The market relies on accurate information for its operation. The 
consequences for misleading information skewing market responses can be 
 
205 See SEITEL, supra note 179, at 42−47 (offering it as a case study of a responsible 
corporate approach). 
206 Jack O’Dwyer, PR Industry’s Amicus Brief [in Nike v. Kasky] Has a Flaw (Nov. 
19, 2002), http://www.odwyerpr.com (accessible only to members), available at 
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/nike/pr_brief_retort_kasky_nike.html. 
207 Id. O’Dwyer’s very laudable purpose in publicizing this issue is to emphasize to the 
profession and its clients that responses to a crisis need to be swift and substantive. Given 
that we have ample evidence in the Tylenol case of the possibility of successfully selling the 
public on the notion that a slow response actually was a swift one, O’Dwyer may be fighting 
a losing battle. It would be beyond the scope of this Article to catalog the numerous similar 
episodes in the political sphere in the last few years. 
208 Id. 
209 SEITEL, supra note 179, at 168−71 (Exxon Valdez as a case study). 
210 Theresa Agovino, Merck Steps Up Public Relations Campaign After Recall, 
CORPWATCH, Nov. 22, 2004, http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11. (public relations 
campaign could be viewed as part of cover-up if claims that Vioxx was pulled from the 
market as soon as the company knew of the problems with it that caused the deaths relating 
to the lawsuits). 
211 Michael Barbaro, A New Weapon for Wal-Mart: A War Room, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2005, at A1 (describing Wal-Mart’s press office set up to respond to stories and allegations 
about Wal-Mart’s labor, environmental and other practices with “press releases, phone calls 
to reporters and instant Web postings”). 
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illustrated with two cases. These two cases are two of many more that might 
illustrate the problem. 
A. The Enron Story 
By now the story of the spectacular rise and fall of the Houston energy 
company, Enron, has been re-told many times.212 There were a number of 
social, personal, and political factors that contributed to the debacle that was 
Enron. However, the role played by publicity and the gullibility of the media 
may not have been sufficiently appreciated. And while it may not be the case 
that retaining the power to regulate corporate press releases for their truth, or at 
least imposing liability when those releases contain information that is not true, 
would necessarily have made any difference to the outcome in Enron, it surely 
cannot be said that extending to these breathless issuances the mantle of First 
Amendment protection would similarly be meaningless. Rather, it would seem 
to be yet another obstacle for the government to overcome in either prosecuting 
or restraining such conduct. 
Many observers now say that the red flags were there to be seen in Enron’s 
financial statements. “Enron’s principals abused the system in plain view, 
taking advantage of the considerable slack it extends to successful actors. 
Although they did not disclose everything, they disclosed more than enough to 
put the system’s layers of monitors on notice that their earnings numbers were 
soft and their liabilities understated.”213 Yet, for some reason, analysts, bankers 
and the media were slow to read the signs of problems. “To the casual reader of 
business weeklies, Enron was riding high at the turn of the 21st century.” 214 
“Fortune Magazine hailed it as America’s most innovative firm for five years 
running.”215 Worse, glowing media coverage and ready acceptance of Enron’s 
officers’ self-assessment of the company turned out to be self-perpetuating. “In 
retrospect, one wonders why Wall Street and the press were so willing—so 
eager even to swallow the idea that Enron was reinventing corporate 
culture.”216 But good press begets more good press. “The fundamental PR 
strategy is to use a story in one publication and then move it up the ladder to 
another publication. Or from one medium (print) to another medium (radio or 
TV).”217 
 
212 See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: 
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy 
B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron’s Public Image Morphed from the Most 
Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: 
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 
2004); KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY (2005). 
213 William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1283 (2002). 
214 Van Niel & Rapoport, supra note 212. 
215 Bratton, supra note 213, at 1276. 
216 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 212, at 121. 
217 RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 251. 
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Enron even succeeded, through a campaign initiated by Andy Fastow and 
adopted and pushed by Enron and CEO Ken Lay, to have CFO Magazine name 
Fastow “CFO of the Year.” 218 The company prepared a “three-paragraph 
letter”219 with “[a]n attachment that ran five pages”220 to support the case that 
Andy Fastow should be CFO Magazine’s “CFO of the Year.” The project was 
“under way for six months.”221 It worked. In 1999, CFO Magazine named 
Fastow “CFO of the Year.”222 Surely such accolades were not irrelevant to the 
general acceptance of Enron? 
But, as indicated in the above discussion of public relations, the business 
of promotion is not limited to getting good press coverage. It also includes 
lobbying activities. “In 2000, Enron also paid $2.1 million to a dozen or so 
Washington lobbying firms.”223 And the business of promotion includes staging 
events, events that themselves will generate good press coverage or positive 
reactions in the target audience. One of Enron’s primary target audiences was 
the corps of market analysts whose reports are relied upon by investors, 
investment banks, regulators, and the press. And here Enron pressed the 
boundaries of promotion straight into fiction when it took analysts on a tour of 
Enron Energy Service’s (EES) supposed “war room.” 
 There, they beheld the very picture of a sophisticated, booming 
business: a big open room, bustling with people, all busily working the 
telephones and hunched over computer terminals, seemingly cutting deals 
and trading energy. Giant plasma screen displayed electronic maps, 
which could show the sites of EES’s many contracts and prospects. 
Commodity prices danced across an electronic ticker. ‘It was impressive,’ 
recalls analyst John Olson, who, at the time, covered the company for 
Merrill Lynch.224 ‘It was a veritable beehive of activity.’ 
 It was also a veritable sham. The war room had been rapidly fitted out 
explicitly to impress the analysts. Though EES was then just gearing up, 
Skilling and Pai had staged it all to convince their visitors that things 
were already happening . . .. The analysts had no clue they’d been 
hoodwinked.225 
 
218 EICHENWALD, supra note 212, at 211 (Fastow proposes the idea to Mark Palmer, 




222 Russ Banham, The Finest in Finance: Andrew S. Fastow, Capital Structure 
Management, CFO MAG., Oct. 1, 1999, at 62. 
223 Bratton, supra note 213, at 1279. 
224 Olson was later fired by Merrill Lynch for his failure to join the chorus of bullish 
reports on Enron and his persistence in asking questions that Enron’s executives did not want 
to answer. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 212, at 180. Of course, now Olson appears 
prescient. But as noted above, many observers, including Olson, say the problems were all in 
plain sight. 
225 Id. at 179−80. See also Jason Leopold, Questioning the Books: Enron Executives 
Helped to Create Fake Trading Room, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at A4. 
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Given this sort of coverage, lobbying, and promotional activities, it is not 
surprising that the naysayers amongst those covering Enron, those responsible 
for approving transactions, and assessing the firm’s viability, etc., found it 
difficult to convince others. Indeed, there is the sense on the part of some 
observers that key Enron players believed their own press and, worse, really did 
believe that the key to performance was entirely in perception rather than 
substance.226 Enron had successfully promoted itself. 
It is possible to say that Enron’s crash proves that the market and the 
marketplace for information works. But at what cost? Is there any question that 
had the company not been permitted to engage in such showmanship, if it had 
been clear that public relations statements could be tested for accuracy and 
might expose the company to liability, that the lack of substance might have 
been revealed sooner? Plenty of companies may engage in “cooking the 
books.” Not all companies manage to simultaneously convince the public that 
they are not only sound, but spectacular. At the very least, should it not be 
crystal clear that even while some of these statements and acts may be 
providing the basis for criminal liability under the current law, that if Nike and 
other proponents of the proposition that public relations is political speech,227 
that is, speech fully protected by the First Amendment, have their way, this 
would not have a positive impact on the reliability of the information in the 
market? 
Enron’s collapse caused undeniable harm. But the connection of the harm 
to the speech and promotional activities in question may be complex enough 
that any cause and effect argument seems tenuous—despite what might be 
widespread agreement that stunts like the Potemkin village of EES operations 
are unethical. Tobacco presents a case in which the connection between the 
harm and the speech appears more robust. 
 
226 According to author Kurt Eichenwald, Mark Palmer, communications director for 
Enron, had to battle CEO Ken Lay’s argument “that Enron’s troubles were just caused by 
bad publicity, not by a flawed business model, not by a mismanaged balance sheet.” 
EICHENWALD, supra note 212, at 852. Further evidence of this (or perhaps just evidence that 
he is out of touch) was offered by Ken Lay’s speech to the Houston Forum on December 13, 
2005, just months before his criminal trial was to begin in which he told the audience, “‘We 
must create our own ‘wave of truth.’” Simon Romero, Enron’s Chief Offers His Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at C1. Ordinarily, criminal defendants are cautioned not to make 
speeches. Of course someone who is innocent might be more inclined to make such a 
speech. This may also be true for those who want to opt for a “brazen-it-out” approach. Lay 
clearly felt the evidence strongly supported him. But it is also likely to be ambiguous enough 
that most lawyers would undoubtedly advise him not to take the risk. The trial began as this 
Article was going to press, so Lay may yet be vindicated. But at the least his speech suggests 
that he is out of touch with the potential consequences of that proceeding. So far as we 
know, he has not yet taken a page out of Richard Scrushy’s book and used a PR firm to 
actually pay a journalist for favorable coverage during his trial. Jay Reeves, Writer Says 
Scrushy Paid for Favorable Copy, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 20, 2006, at E3. 
227 Another way to get protection for this sort of speech and to insulate it from liability 
would be to characterize it as “puffing.” See supra note 115. It might be a neater descriptive 
fit as “puffery,” but the deleterious consequences of insulating the speech from liability 
would be equally obvious. 
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B. The Case Concerning Tobacco 
Given the well documented negative health consequences of cigarette 
smoking, consequences only marginally offset by any positive emotional or 
other boosts, it is, from one perspective, a little remarkable that the product is 
still legal to sell, let alone to promote.228 Still, one might reasonably think that a 
governmental strategy to reduce consumption by reducing the demand 
(whatever that might be) created by attractive promotional materials might be a 
legitimate and sensible policy. Nevertheless, such attempts to regulate tobacco 
advertising beyond the current limitations have, so far, met with little 
success.229 However, the attorneys general of forty-four states successfully sued 
tobacco manufacturers,230 and that suit resulted in a master settlement 
agreement that contained numerous limitations on speech by these companies. 
The tobacco companies were not to engage in sponsorship of events (with 
limited exceptions).231 The companies could not pay for product placement,232 
could not produce market branded merchandise,233 agreed to limits on 
lobbying,234 and agreed to subsidize, on remaining billboard leases, anti-
smoking outdoor advertising “intended to discourage the use of Tobacco 
Products by Youth and their exposure to second-hand smoke.”235 
These are just a few of the provisions of the Master Settlement, and the 
agreement itself could serve as a primer on the variety of activities undertaken 
to promote products. But one of the most interesting aspects, and relevant for 
purposes of this discussion, was the agreement for the dissolution of the 
Tobacco Institute, Inc., the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc., and the 
Center for Indoor Air Research, Inc., along with representations that no new 
non-profits would be formed that would attempt to dispute the health 
consequences of smoking and that any trade organizations formed would 
operate under strict transparency rules. 236 What makes this interesting is that 
 
228 Perhaps it is less curious considering that millions still smoke and that many 
substances taken in excess can act as a poison. So perhaps it would be, all things considered, 
undesirable to have the government declare tobacco illegal. Besides, repression as a strategy 
has not worked very well. It did not work with alcohol during Prohibition. And, despite the 
continuing resistance to legalization with respect to drugs, the war on drugs hasn’t been very 
successful either. 
229 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (Massachusetts statutes 
attempting to regulate the outdoor advertising and point of sale advertising for non-cigarette 
tobacco products struck down under Central Hudson test as overbroad and violative of First 
Amendment; attempt to regulate cigarette advertising preempted by federal law). 
230 See Tobacco Litigation Documents, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacc 
o/litigation/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). 
231 Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., Multistate Settlement with Tobacco Industry at 
13−14, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/msa.pdf (last visited Feb. 
28, 2006). 
232 Id. at 15. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 17. 
235 Id. at 14. 
236 Id. at 19−21. The agreement purports not to “limit the exercise of any First 
Amendment right,” Id. at 21. Some of these restrictions, particularly those relating to the 
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ostensibly these organizations were not-for profit organizations whose whole 
purpose was speech and the dissemination of research findings. Actually 
though, they were PR “front” operations funded by the tobacco industry. Their 
“speech” was simply attacking the promotional difficulties cigarette 
manufacturers were experiencing as a result of the eventual publication of 
studies demonstrating negative health consequences connected with tobacco 
use by issuing counter studies and counter data to create the appearance of an 
“issue.” 
The role of these groups in delaying the general acceptance of the negative 
data did not escape the United States government. And in 1999 it sued not only 
the tobacco companies, but the Council for Tobacco Research-USA, Inc. and 
the Tobacco Institute, as well, alleging a conspiracy by the defendant 
companies and these two non-profit organizations to conceal or diminish 
publication of evidence with regard to the risks of cigarette smoking.237 A key 
component of the complaint alleged that the tobacco companies entered into a 
“gentleman’s agreement” to obscure and obstruct the delivery of information to 
the public about the true dangers of smoking by using the non-profit 
organizations to disseminate information intended to obscure the true nature of 
the addictive properties of nicotine and to diminish or downplay the role of 
smoking in the development of cancer.238 
The Complaint specifically identifies statements made by the Council and 
the Tobacco Institute in which both organizations pledge that they have a 
“responsibility to the public” to help explore the health consequences of 
smoking, and that they were independent research organizations which were 
undertaking to do so.239 The government alleged that these statements “were 
false and misleading when made.”240 “From its inception, TIRC (later CTR) 
was essentially a public relations organization designed to counter adverse 
publicity concerning smoking and health, and not as an independent research 
organization dedicated to getting to the bottom of the smoking and health 
controversy.”241 If the format of this and similar press releases and advertorials 
by the defendants were dispositive for purposes of determining the level of 
First Amendment protection to be accorded to these statements, the government 
would not have been able to pursue this prosecution because the defendants 
would have had a First Amendment defense. Indeed they raised it. “Defendants 
assert affirmative defenses that their innumerable public statements cannot 
serve as a basis for liability or constitute violations of the mail and wire fraud 
 
non-profits, would undoubtedly be unconstitutional had Nike’s definition of protected 
speech been accepted by the Supreme Court in 2003, because the non-profits could point to 
their non-profit status and the issue of the health consequences of smoking as “issues of 
public concern.” 
237 See First Amended Complaint at 2−3, United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 99-C 
V-02496(GK) (D.C. Dist. 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/. 
238 Id. at 21−42. 
239 Id. at 25−26. 
240 Id. at 26. 
241 Id. 
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statutes because they were ‘good-faith’ expressions of opinion or belief and are 
protected by the First Amendment.”242 It just wasn’t successful this time. 
There is no question that the health consequences of smoking constitute 
“issues of public concern.” But it seems equally clear that in such 
circumstances a for-profit entity ought not to be able to immunize false 
statements by claiming they are political speech on issues of public concern. 
“[T]he labels that Defendants now attach to these statements–attempting to cast 
the public communications as political speech, commercial speech, or 
expressions of scientific opinion–are wholly irrelevant. False, misleading, or 
deceptive speech in furtherance of a scheme to defraud receives no First 
Amendment protection.”243 But this is exactly what proponents of broad 
protection for commercial speech issued in the form of public relations would 
authorize. For if it is completely protected, as Nike argued in the Kasky case,244 
albeit in the civil context, then this would represent a serious obstacle to such 
prosecutions. This Article proposes that such speech may fit comfortably into 
the existing commercial speech framework and should be so interpreted, in 
order to retain important governmental and social control over the negative 
social consequences that may arise from a contrary finding. 
V. A PROPOSED TEST 
No test proposed can address all of the potential cases. However, a 
working framework is offered by the California Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kasky v. Nike and which I offer here with some additional suggestions for 
distinguishing between commercial and protected speech in the category of 
public relations speech. “[W]hen a court must decide whether particular speech 
may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms 
of commercial deception, categorizing a particular statement as commercial or 
noncommercial speech requires consideration of three elements: the speaker, 
the intended audience, and the content of the message.”245 
A. The Speaker 
In analyzing the speaker, the first most relevant question is whether it is a 
commercial speaker. As the California Supreme Court noted, in commercial 
speech cases the “speaker is likely to be someone engaged in commerce—that 
is, generally, the production, distribution, or sale of good or services—or 
someone acting on behalf of a person so engaged.”246 Of course this runs the 
risk of simply re-framing the question without actually answering it. But 
generally “commercial speech” is going to be issued from a for-profit business 
 
242 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Litigation Against Tobacco Companies, United States v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., Civil Action No. 99-CV-02496(GK) (Jul. 1, 2004), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/ (emphasis added). 
243 Id. at 42−43 (emphasis added). 
244 See Piety, Grounding Nike, supra note 8, at 192. 
245 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 311 (Cal. 2002). 
246 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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enterprise. As the Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions, the 
existence of an economic motive is not dispositive. Authors don’t generally 
write books for their own satisfaction. They hope to sell them. But typically 
authors do not write books in order to sell something else.247 The product 
authors are selling is the speech itself. 
This distinguishes the case of the manufacturers of products which are 
themselves speech products. A cogent case has been made out by Professor C. 
Edwin Baker for carving out a similar exception for newspapers and other news 
media.248 But by the same token this does not mean that non-profit status is 
dispositive. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court 
had no trouble finding that a law aimed at for-profit corporations’ political 
speech and the endorsement of candidates could be applied to a non-profit 
organization where “more than three-quarters of the Chamber’s members are 
business corporations.”249 Were the Court to adopt a rigid profit/not-for-profit 
distinction, the Court noted, “[b]usiness corporations . . . could circumvent the 
Act’s restrictions by funneling money through the Chamber’s general 
treasury.”250 This is precisely what the government alleged the tobacco 
companies did in the case of dissemination of “information” about smoking. 
For purposes of applying the commercial speech doctrine, there is ample 
precedent from which to draw that suggests that it is appropriate to distinguish 
between commercial and non-commercial speakers,251 and that the designation 
“commercial” be considered a factual question. 
B. The Intended Audience 
Although the obvious audience for commercial speech is consumers, it 
was in part concern for the proper operation of the market, of which consumers 
were a part, that prompted the Virginia Pharmacy Court’s concern about 
protecting truthful information. Cases like Enron make clear that consumers are 
 
247 Author Fay Weldon’s contract with Bulgari may represent an exception. See Calvin 
Reid, Weldon’s Bulgari Product Placement Raises Eyebrows , PUBLISHERS WKLY., Sept. 10, 
2001, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/CA155440.html?pubdate=9%2 
F10%2F2001&display=archive. But I would also note that some of the marketing, business, 
self-help, and similar texts do seem to be authored with an eye to promoting the authors’ 
services in another sector. The Ries & Ries book, supra note 2, and the Atkin book, supra 
note 128, seem to be drawn largely from case studies of their own clients and seem to 
promote their services and their approach to existing and future clients. 
248 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225−49 (1989) 
(arguing for separate treatment of the press through the First Amendment on the basis of the 
press clause, independent of the speech clause); BAKER, supra note 29, at 5 (arguing there is 
a basis for protecting the press as a constitutive part of a democracy rather than as merely an 
extension of the individual’s right of self-expression.). 
249 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 662−64 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238 (1986), for the proposition that non-profits formed for “the express purpose of 
promoting political ideas” and having a policy not to accept corporate contributions are 
distinguishable from business corporations). 
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not the only parties who influence the proper functioning of the market. The 
California Supreme Court observed in Kasky that the “intended audience is 
likely to be actual or potential buyers or customers of the speaker’s good or 
services.”252 But it also noted that the intended audience could include “persons 
acting for actual or potential buyers or customers, or persons (such as reporters 
or reviewers) likely to repeat the message to or otherwise influence actual or 
potential buyers or customers.”253 Such a test then encompasses analysts, as in 
the Enron case, or college presidents and athletic directors in the Nike case, and 
would not immunize statements simply because they were not directed at end 
users. 
C. Message Content 
Finally, key to regulating in this area is that the court must be dealing with 
material about which it is meaningful to regulate for whether it is truthful or is 
instead false, deceptive, or misleading. Broad statements such as “We are a 
Company That Cares” may not be actionable to the extent that the statement is 
so vague, so capable of multiple interpretations, that the resolution is open to 
dispute that cannot be resolved by examination of the facts.254 Of course it is 
not the case that the facts will always speak for themselves in terms of 
resolving a dispute. But clear-cut factual assertions, such as, “we pay our 
employees minimum wage,” may be susceptible to proof and should not be 
immunized as puff or opinion. Combined with the economic motivation of 
stimulating sales or business, a limitation to factual assertions both imposes no 
onerous burden and does not set up the government as arbiter of truth. The 
California Supreme Court noted that such “representations of fact” would not 
be limited to the company’s products or services, but could include “the 
business operations” as well.255 Consumers care about all aspects of a 
company’s conduct of its business operations and the rest of the relevant 
market players do as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Those entities seeking to profit from information injected into the stream 
of commerce need to be accountable for the quality of that information. The 
incentives for the information to be misleading and inaccurate are too great and 
the consequences to the public too high for it to be in the public interest to issue 
these companies a First Amendment blank check. Public relations statements 
are issued in support of marketing and commercial objectives. For-profit 
corporations have no other legitimate reason to issue such speech. There is no 
reason why the public should subsidize them by not only ensuring that they can 
 
252 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 311 (Cal. 2002) (emphasis in original). 
253 Id. 
254 But it may still be possible that in context such a statement would be actionable if 
sufficient factual support was offered for the proposition that the speaker intended a 
particular interpretation that was not supported by the facts. 
255 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 312. 
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get “free advertising” in the context of public relations, but that there will be no 
legal consequences for false speech. Given the relative paucity of explicit 
claims in “traditional advertising,” claims which under current doctrine can be 
tested for their truth, and the clear marketing and commercial relevance of 
explicit claims made in the public relations context, far from being cut back, 
the Supreme Court ought to make clear that the commercial speech doctrine 
includes statements made in the public relations context.256 The Court should 
reaffirm the commitment it made earlier in the doctrine’s genesis, that merely 
inserting a matter of public interest will not immunize commercial statements 
from regulatory scrutiny when the public is likely to be misled.257 It is still in 
the interest of the proper functioning of the market that “the stream of 
commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”258 
 
 
256 It seems clear that those concerned with advising corporations about these practices 
do not rule out the possibility of liability stemming from public relations. See Andrea J. 
Nordaune, Sales and Advertising: Keeping the Promises We Make, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 361, 369 (2000) (“Require that all communications that go outside the company go 
through the formal review process [for accuracy] (television and radio commercials, print 
advertising, sales and promotional brochures, catalogs, press releases, trade show exhibits 
and distribution pieces, etc.”)); Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 99 (observing that the “most 
important finding” of the California Kasky court was “that public relations expression is not 
fully protected under the First Amendment as both conventional wisdom and some scholarly 
studies have suggested.”) (emphasis in original). 
257 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983). 
258 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
772 (1976). 
